HB5565 94TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LRB094 18455 RLC 53770 b

94TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2005 and 2006
HB5565

Introduced 1/27/2006, by Rep. Naomi D. Jakobsson

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:

720 ILCS 5/11-6	from Ch. 38, par. 11-6
720 ILCS 5/11-6.5
720 ILCS 5/32-10	from Ch. 38, par. 32-10
730 ILCS 5/5-5-6	from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-6
730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1	from Ch. 38, par. 1005-6-3.1
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1	from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1
705 ILCS 405/2-13.1
720 ILCS 5/12-3.2	from Ch. 38, par. 12-3.2
720 ILCS 5/12-30	from Ch. 38, par. 12-30
720 ILCS 135/2	from Ch. 134, par. 16.5
725 ILCS 5/115-7	from Ch. 38, par. 115-7
725 ILCS 5/115-10.2
750 ILCS 50/1	from Ch. 40, par. 1501

Amends the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and the Adoption Act. Provides for the termination of parent rights for the commission of various acts against children. Amends the Criminal Code of 1961 and the Unified Code of Corrections. Reenacts various criminal provisions of P.A. 89-203 that were held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Wooters as violating the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. Amends the Criminal Code of 1961, the Harassing and Obscene Communications Act, and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Changes the elements of the offenses of domestic battery, violation of an order of protection, and harassing and obscene communications. Makes other changes.

CORRECTIONAL BUDGET AND IMPACT NOTE ACT MAY APPLY

A BILL FOR

AN ACT concerning domestic violence.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

ARTICLE 1. REENACTMENT

Section 1-1. Purpose.

(1) The General Assembly finds and declares that:

(i) Public Act 89-203, effective July 21, 1995, contained provisions amending the Criminal Code of 1961, and the Unified Code of Corrections. Public Act 89-203 also contained other provisions, including revisions to the Vehicle Code, the Counties Code, and the Code of Civil Procedure.

(ii) On November 18, 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Wooters, 1999, 243 Ill. Dec. 33, 188 Ill.2d 500, 722 N.E.2d 1102 ruled that Public Act 89-203 violates the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Article IV, Section 8 (d)) and was unconstitutional in its entirety.

(iii) The provisions of Public Act 89-203 amending the Criminal Code of 1961 and the Unified Code of Corrections are of vital concern to the people of this State and legislative action concerning those provisions of Public Act 89-203 is necessary.

(2) One of the purposes of this Act is to re-enact certain criminal provisions of Public Act 89-203, including subsequent amendments. This re-enactment is intended to remove any question as to the validity or content of those provisions.

(3) This Act re-enacts certain criminal provisions of Public Act 89-203, including subsequent amendments, to remove any question as to the validity or content of those provisions; it is not intended to supersede any other Public Act that amends the text of the Sections as set forth in this Act. The material is shown as existing text (i.e., without underscoring), except for technical changes having a revisory function.

Section 1-5. The Criminal Code of 1961 is amended by reenacting Sections 11-6, 11-6.5, and 32-10 as follows:

(720 ILCS 5/11-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 11-6)

Sec. 11-6. Indecent solicitation of a child.

(a) A person of the age of 17 years and upwards commits the offense of indecent solicitation of a child if the person, with the intent that the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse be committed, knowingly solicits a child or one whom he or she believes to be a child to perform an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 12-12 of this Code.

(b) Definitions. As used in this Section:

"Solicit" means to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to perform an act by any means including, but not limited to, in person, over the phone, in writing, by computer, or by advertisement of any kind.

"Child" means a person under 17 years of age.

(c) Sentence. Indecent solicitation of a child is:

(1) a Class 1 felony when the act, if done, would be predatory criminal sexual assault of a child or aggravated criminal sexual assault;

(2) a Class 2 felony when the act, if done, would be criminal sexual assault;

(3) a Class 3 felony when the act, if done, would be aggravated criminal sexual abuse.

(Source: P.A. 91-226, eff. 7-22-99.)

(720 ILCS 5/11-6.5)

Sec. 11-6.5. Indecent solicitation of an adult.

(a) A person commits indecent solicitation of an adult if the person:

(1) Arranges for a person 17 years of age or over to commit an act of sexual penetration as defined in Section 12-12 with a person:

(i) Under the age of 13 years; or

(ii) Thirteen years of age or over but under the age of 17 years; or

(2) Arranges for a person 17 years of age or over to commit an act of sexual conduct as defined in Section 12-12 with a person:

(i) Under the age of 13 years; or

(ii) Thirteen years of age or older but under the age of 17 years.

(b) Sentence.

(1) Violation of paragraph (a)(1)(i) is a Class X felony.

(2) Violation of paragraph (a)(1)(ii) is a Class 1 felony.

(3) Violation of paragraph (a)(2)(i) is a Class 2 felony.

(4) Violation of paragraph (a)(2)(ii) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) For the purposes of this Section, "arranges" includes but is not limited to oral or written communication and communication by telephone, computer, or other electronic means. "Computer" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 16D-2 of this Code.

(Source: P.A. 88-165; 89-203, eff. 7-21-95.)

(720 ILCS 5/32-10) (from Ch. 38, par. 32-10)

Sec. 32-10. Violation of bail bond.

(a) Whoever, having been admitted to bail for appearance before any court of this State, incurs a forfeiture of the bail and willfully fails to surrender himself within 30 days following the date of such forfeiture, commits, if the bail was given in connection with a charge of felony or pending appeal or certiorari after conviction of any offense, a felony of the next lower Class or a Class A misdemeanor if the underlying offense was a Class 4 felony; or, if the bail was given in connection with a charge of committing a misdemeanor, or for appearance as a witness, commits a misdemeanor of the next lower Class, but not less than a Class C misdemeanor.

(a-5) Any person who violates a condition of bail bond by possessing a firearm in violation of his or her conditions of bail commits a Class 4 felony for a first violation and a Class 3 felony for a second violation.

(b) Whoever, having been admitted to bail for appearance before any court of this State, while charged with a criminal offense in which the victim is a family or household member as defined in Article 112A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, knowingly violates a condition of that release as set forth in Section 110-10, subsection (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, commits a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) Whoever, having been admitted to bail for appearance before any court of this State for a felony, Class A misdemeanor or a criminal offense in which the victim is a family or household member as defined in Article 112A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, is charged with any other felony, Class A misdemeanor, or a criminal offense in which the victim is a family or household member as defined in Article 112A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 while on such release, must appear before the court before bail is statutorily set.

(d) Nothing in this Section shall interfere with or prevent the exercise by any court of its power to punishment for contempt. Any sentence imposed for violation of this Section shall be served consecutive to the sentence imposed for the charge for which bail had been granted and with respect to which the defendant has been convicted.

(Source: P.A. 91-696, eff. 4-13-00.)

Section 1-10. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended by reenacting Sections 5-5-6, 5-6-3.1, and 5-8-1 as follows:

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-6) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-6)

Sec. 5-5-6. In all convictions for offenses in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 in which the person received any injury to their person or damage to their real or personal property as a result of the criminal act of the defendant, the court shall order restitution as provided in this Section. In all other cases, except cases in which restitution is required under this Section, the court must at the sentence hearing determine whether restitution is an appropriate sentence to be imposed on each defendant convicted of an offense. If the court determines that an order directing the offender to make restitution is appropriate, the offender may be sentenced to make restitution. The court may consider restitution an appropriate sentence to be imposed on each defendant convicted of an offense in addition to a sentence of imprisonment. The sentence of the defendant to a term of imprisonment is not a mitigating factor that prevents the court from ordering the defendant to pay restitution. If the offender is sentenced to make restitution the Court shall determine the restitution as hereinafter set forth:

(a) At the sentence hearing, the court shall determine whether the property may be restored in kind to the possession of the owner or the person entitled to possession thereof; or whether the defendant is possessed of sufficient skill to repair and restore property damaged; or whether the defendant should be required to make restitution in cash, for out-of-pocket expenses, damages, losses, or injuries found to have been proximately caused by the conduct of the defendant or another for whom the defendant is legally accountable under the provisions of Article V of the Criminal Code of 1961.

(b) In fixing the amount of restitution to be paid in cash, the court shall allow credit for property returned in kind, for property damages ordered to be repaired by the defendant, and for property ordered to be restored by the defendant; and after granting the credit, the court shall assess the actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries suffered by the victim named in the charge and any other victims who may also have suffered out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries proximately caused by the same criminal conduct of the defendant, and insurance carriers who have indemnified the named victim or other victims for the out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries, provided that in no event shall restitution be ordered to be paid on account of pain and suffering. If a defendant is placed on supervision for, or convicted of, domestic battery, the defendant shall be required to pay restitution to any domestic violence shelter in which the victim and any other family or household members lived because of the domestic battery. The amount of the restitution shall equal the actual expenses of the domestic violence shelter in providing housing and any other services for the victim and any other family or household members living at the shelter. If a defendant fails to pay restitution in the manner or within the time period specified by the court, the court may enter an order directing the sheriff to seize any real or personal property of a defendant to the extent necessary to satisfy the order of restitution and dispose of the property by public sale. All proceeds from such sale in excess of the amount of restitution plus court costs and the costs of the sheriff in conducting the sale shall be paid to the defendant. The defendant convicted of domestic battery, if a person under 18 years of age was present and witnessed the domestic battery of the victim, is liable to pay restitution for the cost of any counseling required for the child at the discretion of the court.

(c) In cases where more than one defendant is accountable for the same criminal conduct that results in out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries, each defendant shall be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the total actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries to the victim proximately caused by the conduct of all of the defendants who are legally accountable for the offense.

(1) In no event shall the victim be entitled to recover restitution in excess of the actual out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, or injuries, proximately caused by the conduct of all of the defendants.

(2) As between the defendants, the court may apportion the restitution that is payable in proportion to each co-defendant's culpability in the commission of the offense.

(3) In the absence of a specific order apportioning the restitution, each defendant shall bear his pro rata share of the restitution.

(4) As between the defendants, each defendant shall be entitled to a pro rata reduction in the total restitution required to be paid to the victim for amounts of restitution actually paid by co-defendants, and defendants who shall have paid more than their pro rata share shall be entitled to refunds to be computed by the court as additional amounts are paid by co-defendants.

(d) In instances where a defendant has more than one criminal charge pending against him in a single case, or more than one case, and the defendant stands convicted of one or more charges, a plea agreement negotiated by the State's Attorney and the defendants may require the defendant to make restitution to victims of charges that have been dismissed or which it is contemplated will be dismissed under the terms of the plea agreement, and under the agreement, the court may impose a sentence of restitution on the charge or charges of which the defendant has been convicted that would require the defendant to make restitution to victims of other offenses as provided in the plea agreement.

(e) The court may require the defendant to apply the balance of the cash bond, after payment of court costs, and any fine that may be imposed to the payment of restitution.

(f) Taking into consideration the ability of the defendant to pay, including any real or personal property or any other assets of the defendant, the court shall determine whether restitution shall be paid in a single payment or in installments, and shall fix a period of time not in excess of 5 years or the period of time specified in subsection (f-1), not including periods of incarceration, within which payment of restitution is to be paid in full. Complete restitution shall be paid in as short a time period as possible. However, if the court deems it necessary and in the best interest of the victim, the court may extend beyond 5 years the period of time within which the payment of restitution is to be paid. If the defendant is ordered to pay restitution and the court orders that restitution is to be paid over a period greater than 6 months, the court shall order that the defendant make monthly payments; the court may waive this requirement of monthly payments only if there is a specific finding of good cause for waiver.

(f-1)(1) In addition to any other penalty prescribed by law and any restitution ordered under this Section that did not include long-term physical health care costs, the court may, upon conviction of any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay restitution to a victim in accordance with the provisions of this subsection (f-1) if the victim has suffered physical injury as a result of the offense that is reasonably probable to require or has required long-term physical health care for more than 3 months. As used in this subsection (f-1) "long-term physical health care" includes mental health care.

(2) The victim's estimate of long-term physical health care costs may be made as part of a victim impact statement under Section 6 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act or made separately. The court shall enter the long-term physical health care restitution order at the time of sentencing. An order of restitution made under this subsection (f-1) shall fix a monthly amount to be paid by the defendant for as long as long-term physical health care of the victim is required as a result of the offense. The order may exceed the length of any sentence imposed upon the defendant for the criminal activity. The court shall include as a special finding in the judgment of conviction its determination of the monthly cost of long-term physical health care.

(3) After a sentencing order has been entered, the court may from time to time, on the petition of either the defendant or the victim, or upon its own motion, enter an order for restitution for long-term physical care or modify the existing order for restitution for long-term physical care as to the amount of monthly payments. Any modification of the order shall be based only upon a substantial change of circumstances relating to the cost of long-term physical health care or the financial condition of either the defendant or the victim. The petition shall be filed as part of the original criminal docket.

(g) In addition to the sentences provided for in Sections 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, and 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the court may order any person who is convicted of violating any of those Sections or who was charged with any of those offenses and which charge was reduced to another charge as a result of a plea agreement under subsection (d) of this Section to meet all or any portion of the financial obligations of treatment, including but not limited to medical, psychiatric, or rehabilitative treatment or psychological counseling, prescribed for the victim or victims of the offense.

The payments shall be made by the defendant to the clerk of the circuit court and transmitted by the clerk to the appropriate person or agency as directed by the court. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f-1), the order may require such payments to be made for a period not to exceed 5 years after sentencing, not including periods of incarceration.

(h) The judge may enter an order of withholding to collect the amount of restitution owed in accordance with Part 8 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(i) A sentence of restitution may be modified or revoked by the court if the offender commits another offense, or the offender fails to make restitution as ordered by the court, but no sentence to make restitution shall be revoked unless the court shall find that the offender has had the financial ability to make restitution, and he has wilfully refused to do so. When the offender's ability to pay restitution was established at the time an order of restitution was entered or modified, or when the offender's ability to pay was based on the offender's willingness to make restitution as part of a plea agreement made at the time the order of restitution was entered or modified, there is a rebuttable presumption that the facts and circumstances considered by the court at the hearing at which the order of restitution was entered or modified regarding the offender's ability or willingness to pay restitution have not materially changed. If the court shall find that the defendant has failed to make restitution and that the failure is not wilful, the court may impose an additional period of time within which to make restitution. The length of the additional period shall not be more than 2 years. The court shall retain all of the incidents of the original sentence, including the authority to modify or enlarge the conditions, and to revoke or further modify the sentence if the conditions of payment are violated during the additional period.

(j) The procedure upon the filing of a Petition to Revoke a sentence to make restitution shall be the same as the procedures set forth in Section 5-6-4 of this Code governing violation, modification, or revocation of Probation, of Conditional Discharge, or of Supervision.

(k) Nothing contained in this Section shall preclude the right of any party to proceed in a civil action to recover for any damages incurred due to the criminal misconduct of the defendant.

(l) Restitution ordered under this Section shall not be subject to disbursement by the circuit clerk under Section 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act.

(m) A restitution order under this Section is a judgment lien in favor of the victim that:

(1) Attaches to the property of the person subject to the order;

(2) May be perfected in the same manner as provided in Part 3 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code;

(3) May be enforced to satisfy any payment that is delinquent under the restitution order by the person in whose favor the order is issued or the person's assignee; and

(4) Expires in the same manner as a judgment lien created in a civil proceeding.

When a restitution order is issued under this Section, the issuing court shall send a certified copy of the order to the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the charge was filed. Upon receiving the order, the clerk shall enter and index the order in the circuit court judgment docket.

(n) An order of restitution under this Section does not bar a civil action for:

(1) Damages that the court did not require the person to pay to the victim under the restitution order but arise from an injury or property damages that is the basis of restitution ordered by the court; and

(2) Other damages suffered by the victim.

The restitution order is not discharged by the completion of the sentence imposed for the offense.

A restitution order under this Section is not discharged by the liquidation of a person's estate by a receiver. A restitution order under this Section may be enforced in the same manner as judgment liens are enforced under Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The provisions of Section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for interest on judgments, apply to judgments for restitution entered under this Section.

(Source: P.A. 94-148, eff. 1-1-06; 94-397, eff. 1-1-06; revised 8-19-05.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-6-3.1)

Sec. 5-6-3.1. Incidents and Conditions of Supervision.

(a) When a defendant is placed on supervision, the court shall enter an order for supervision specifying the period of such supervision, and shall defer further proceedings in the case until the conclusion of the period.

(b) The period of supervision shall be reasonable under all of the circumstances of the case, but may not be longer than 2 years, unless the defendant has failed to pay the assessment required by Section 10.3 of the Cannabis Control Act, Section 411.2 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or Section 80 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, in which case the court may extend supervision beyond 2 years. Additionally, the court shall order the defendant to perform no less than 30 hours of community service and not more than 120 hours of community service, if community service is available in the jurisdiction and is funded and approved by the county board where the offense was committed, when the offense (1) was related to or in furtherance of the criminal activities of an organized gang or was motivated by the defendant's membership in or allegiance to an organized gang; or (2) is a violation of any Section of Article 24 of the Criminal Code of 1961 where a disposition of supervision is not prohibited by Section 5-6-1 of this Code. The community service shall include, but not be limited to, the cleanup and repair of any damage caused by violation of Section 21-1.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 and similar damages to property located within the municipality or county in which the violation occurred. Where possible and reasonable, the community service should be performed in the offender's neighborhood.

For the purposes of this Section, "organized gang" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act.

(c) The court may in addition to other reasonable conditions relating to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant as determined for each defendant in the proper discretion of the court require that the person:

(1) make a report to and appear in person before or participate with the court or such courts, person, or social service agency as directed by the court in the order of supervision;

(2) pay a fine and costs;

(3) work or pursue a course of study or vocational training;

(4) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment; or treatment for drug addiction or alcoholism;

(5) attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction or residence of defendants on probation;

(6) support his dependents;

(7) refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon;

(8) and in addition, if a minor:

(i) reside with his parents or in a foster home;

(ii) attend school;

(iii) attend a non-residential program for youth;

(iv) contribute to his own support at home or in a foster home; or

(v) with the consent of the superintendent of the facility, attend an educational program at a facility other than the school in which the offense was committed if he or she is placed on supervision for a crime of violence as defined in Section 2 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act committed in a school, on the real property comprising a school, or within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a school;

(9) make restitution or reparation in an amount not to exceed actual loss or damage to property and pecuniary loss or make restitution under Section 5-5-6 to a domestic violence shelter. The court shall determine the amount and conditions of payment;

(10) perform some reasonable public or community service;

(11) comply with the terms and conditions of an order of protection issued by the court pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or an order of protection issued by the court of another state, tribe, or United States territory. If the court has ordered the defendant to make a report and appear in person under paragraph (1) of this subsection, a copy of the order of protection shall be transmitted to the person or agency so designated by the court;

(12) reimburse any "local anti-crime program" as defined in Section 7 of the Anti-Crime Advisory Council Act for any reasonable expenses incurred by the program on the offender's case, not to exceed the maximum amount of the fine authorized for the offense for which the defendant was sentenced;

(13) contribute a reasonable sum of money, not to exceed the maximum amount of the fine authorized for the offense for which the defendant was sentenced, to a "local anti-crime program", as defined in Section 7 of the Anti-Crime Advisory Council Act;

(14) refrain from entering into a designated geographic area except upon such terms as the court finds appropriate. Such terms may include consideration of the purpose of the entry, the time of day, other persons accompanying the defendant, and advance approval by a probation officer;

(15) refrain from having any contact, directly or indirectly, with certain specified persons or particular types of person, including but not limited to members of street gangs and drug users or dealers;

(16) refrain from having in his or her body the presence of any illicit drug prohibited by the Cannabis Control Act, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, unless prescribed by a physician, and submit samples of his or her blood or urine or both for tests to determine the presence of any illicit drug;

(17) refrain from operating any motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device as defined in Section 1-129.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Under this condition the court may allow a defendant who is not self-employed to operate a vehicle owned by the defendant's employer that is not equipped with an ignition interlock device in the course and scope of the defendant's employment; and

(18) if placed on supervision for a sex offense as defined in subsection (a-5) of Section 3-1-2 of this Code, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of the person under 18 years of age present in the home and no non-familial minors are present, not participate in a holiday event involving children under 18 years of age, such as distributing candy or other items to children on Halloween, wearing a Santa Claus costume on or preceding Christmas, being employed as a department store Santa Claus, or wearing an Easter Bunny costume on or preceding Easter.

(d) The court shall defer entering any judgment on the charges until the conclusion of the supervision.

(e) At the conclusion of the period of supervision, if the court determines that the defendant has successfully complied with all of the conditions of supervision, the court shall discharge the defendant and enter a judgment dismissing the charges.

(f) Discharge and dismissal upon a successful conclusion of a disposition of supervision shall be deemed without adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime. Two years after the discharge and dismissal under this Section, unless the disposition of supervision was for a violation of Sections 3-707, 3-708, 3-710, 5-401.3, or 11-503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or for a violation of Sections 12-3.2 or 16A-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, in which case it shall be 5 years after discharge and dismissal, a person may have his record of arrest sealed or expunged as may be provided by law. However, any defendant placed on supervision before January 1, 1980, may move for sealing or expungement of his arrest record, as provided by law, at any time after discharge and dismissal under this Section. A person placed on supervision for a sexual offense committed against a minor as defined in subsection (g) of Section 5 of the Criminal Identification Act or for a violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance shall not have his or her record of arrest sealed or expunged.

(g) A defendant placed on supervision and who during the period of supervision undergoes mandatory drug or alcohol testing, or both, or is assigned to be placed on an approved electronic monitoring device, shall be ordered to pay the costs incidental to such mandatory drug or alcohol testing, or both, and costs incidental to such approved electronic monitoring in accordance with the defendant's ability to pay those costs. The county board with the concurrence of the Chief Judge of the judicial circuit in which the county is located shall establish reasonable fees for the cost of maintenance, testing, and incidental expenses related to the mandatory drug or alcohol testing, or both, and all costs incidental to approved electronic monitoring, of all defendants placed on supervision. The concurrence of the Chief Judge shall be in the form of an administrative order. The fees shall be collected by the clerk of the circuit court. The clerk of the circuit court shall pay all moneys collected from these fees to the county treasurer who shall use the moneys collected to defray the costs of drug testing, alcohol testing, and electronic monitoring. The county treasurer shall deposit the fees collected in the county working cash fund under Section 6-27001 or Section 6-29002 of the Counties Code, as the case may be.

(h) A disposition of supervision is a final order for the purposes of appeal.

(i) The court shall impose upon a defendant placed on supervision after January 1, 1992 or to community service under the supervision of a probation or court services department after January 1, 2004, as a condition of supervision or supervised community service, a fee of $50 for each month of supervision or supervised community service ordered by the court, unless after determining the inability of the person placed on supervision or supervised community service to pay the fee, the court assesses a lesser fee. The court may not impose the fee on a minor who is made a ward of the State under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 while the minor is in placement. The fee shall be imposed only upon a defendant who is actively supervised by the probation and court services department. The fee shall be collected by the clerk of the circuit court. The clerk of the circuit court shall pay all monies collected from this fee to the county treasurer for deposit in the probation and court services fund pursuant to Section 15.1 of the Probation and Probation Officers Act.

A circuit court may not impose a probation fee in excess of $25 per month unless: (1) the circuit court has adopted, by administrative order issued by the chief judge, a standard probation fee guide determining an offender's ability to pay, under guidelines developed by the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts; and (2) the circuit court has authorized, by administrative order issued by the chief judge, the creation of a Crime Victim's Services Fund, to be administered by the Chief Judge or his or her designee, for services to crime victims and their families. Of the amount collected as a probation fee, not to exceed $5 of that fee collected per month may be used to provide services to crime victims and their families.

(j) All fines and costs imposed under this Section for any violation of Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, and any violation of the Child Passenger Protection Act, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, shall be collected and disbursed by the circuit clerk as provided under Section 27.5 of the Clerks of Courts Act.

(k) A defendant at least 17 years of age who is placed on supervision for a misdemeanor in a county of 3,000,000 or more inhabitants and who has not been previously convicted of a misdemeanor or felony may as a condition of his or her supervision be required by the court to attend educational courses designed to prepare the defendant for a high school diploma and to work toward a high school diploma or to work toward passing the high school level Test of General Educational Development (GED) or to work toward completing a vocational training program approved by the court. The defendant placed on supervision must attend a public institution of education to obtain the educational or vocational training required by this subsection (k). The defendant placed on supervision shall be required to pay for the cost of the educational courses or GED test, if a fee is charged for those courses or test. The court shall revoke the supervision of a person who wilfully fails to comply with this subsection (k). The court shall resentence the defendant upon revocation of supervision as provided in Section 5-6-4. This subsection (k) does not apply to a defendant who has a high school diploma or has successfully passed the GED test. This subsection (k) does not apply to a defendant who is determined by the court to be developmentally disabled or otherwise mentally incapable of completing the educational or vocational program.

(l) The court shall require a defendant placed on supervision for possession of a substance prohibited by the Cannabis Control Act, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act after a previous conviction or disposition of supervision for possession of a substance prohibited by the Cannabis Control Act, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act or a sentence of probation under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act or Section 410 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act and after a finding by the court that the person is addicted, to undergo treatment at a substance abuse program approved by the court.

(m) The Secretary of State shall require anyone placed on court supervision for a violation of Section 3-707 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance to give proof of his or her financial responsibility as defined in Section 7-315 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The proof shall be maintained by the individual in a manner satisfactory to the Secretary of State for a minimum period of one year after the date the proof is first filed. The proof shall be limited to a single action per arrest and may not be affected by any post-sentence disposition. The Secretary of State shall suspend the driver's license of any person determined by the Secretary to be in violation of this subsection.

(n) Any offender placed on supervision for any offense that the court or probation department has determined to be sexually motivated as defined in the Sex Offender Management Board Act shall be required to refrain from any contact, directly or indirectly, with any persons specified by the court and shall be available for all evaluations and treatment programs required by the court or the probation department.

(o) An offender placed on supervision for a sex offense as defined in the Sex Offender Management Board Act shall refrain from residing at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense. The provisions of this subsection (o) do not apply to a person convicted of a sex offense who is placed in a Department of Corrections licensed transitional housing facility for sex offenders.

(Source: P.A. 93-475, eff. 8-8-03; 93-970, eff. 8-20-04; 94-159, eff. 7-11-05; 94-161, eff. 7-11-05; 94-556, eff. 9-11-05; revised 8-19-05.)

(730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1)

Sec. 5-8-1. Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:

(1) for first degree murder,

(a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years, or

(b) if a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 are present, the court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment, or

(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment when the death penalty is not imposed if the defendant,

(i) has previously been convicted of first degree murder under any state or federal law, or

(ii) is a person who, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an individual under 12 years of age; or, irrespective of the defendant's age at the time of the commission of the offense, is found guilty of murdering more than one victim, or

(iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker when the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the peace officer or fireman from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker from performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker, or

(iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, when the employee was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the employee from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the employee performing his official duties, or

(v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver or other medical assistance or first aid person while employed by a municipality or other governmental unit when the person was killed in the course of performing official duties or to prevent the person from performing official duties or in retaliation for performing official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistant or first aid personnel, or

(vi) is a person who, at the time of the commission of the murder, had not attained the age of 17, and is found guilty of murdering a person under 12 years of age and the murder is committed during the course of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnaping, or

(vii) is found guilty of first degree murder and the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer. For the purpose of this Section, "community policing volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

For purposes of clause (v), "emergency medical technician - ambulance", "emergency medical technician - intermediate", "emergency medical technician - paramedic", have the meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.

(d) (i) if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(ii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(iii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.

(1.5) for second degree murder, a term shall be not less than 4 years and not more than 20 years;

(2) for a person adjudged a habitual criminal under Article 33B of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment;

(2.5) for a person convicted under the circumstances described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section 12-13, paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Section 12-14, paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1, or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment;

(3) except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, for a Class X felony, the sentence shall be not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years;

(4) for a Class 1 felony, other than second degree murder, the sentence shall be not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years;

(5) for a Class 2 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years;

(6) for a Class 3 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 2 years and not more than 5 years;

(7) for a Class 4 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 1 year and not more than 3 years.

(b) The sentencing judge in each felony conviction shall set forth his reasons for imposing the particular sentence he enters in the case, as provided in Section 5-4-1 of this Code. Those reasons may include any mitigating or aggravating factors specified in this Code, or the lack of any such circumstances, as well as any other such factors as the judge shall set forth on the record that are consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in this Code.

(c) A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after the sentence is imposed. A defendant's challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence. However, the court may not increase a sentence once it is imposed.

If a motion filed pursuant to this subsection is timely filed within 30 days after the sentence is imposed, the proponent of the motion shall exercise due diligence in seeking a determination on the motion and the court shall thereafter decide such motion within a reasonable time.

If a motion filed pursuant to this subsection is timely filed within 30 days after the sentence is imposed, then for purposes of perfecting an appeal, a final judgment shall not be considered to have been entered until the motion to reduce a sentence has been decided by order entered by the trial court.

A motion filed pursuant to this subsection shall not be considered to have been timely filed unless it is filed with the circuit court clerk within 30 days after the sentence is imposed together with a notice of motion, which notice of motion shall set the motion on the court's calendar on a date certain within a reasonable time after the date of filing.

(d) Except where a term of natural life is imposed, every sentence shall include as though written therein a term in addition to the term of imprisonment. For those sentenced under the law in effect prior to February 1, 1978, such term shall be identified as a parole term. For those sentenced on or after February 1, 1978, such term shall be identified as a mandatory supervised release term. Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8, the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be as follows:

(1) for first degree murder or a Class X felony except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, 3 years;

(2) for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony except for the offense of criminal sexual assault if committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, 2 years;

(3) for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4 felony, 1 year;

(4) for defendants who commit the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly, the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant;

(5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an electronic home detention program under Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code.

(e) A defendant who has a previous and unexpired sentence of imprisonment imposed by another state or by any district court of the United States and who, after sentence for a crime in Illinois, must return to serve the unexpired prior sentence may have his sentence by the Illinois court ordered to be concurrent with the prior sentence in the other state. The court may order that any time served on the unexpired portion of the sentence in the other state, prior to his return to Illinois, shall be credited on his Illinois sentence. The other state shall be furnished with a copy of the order imposing sentence which shall provide that, when the offender is released from confinement of the other state, whether by parole or by termination of sentence, the offender shall be transferred by the Sheriff of the committing county to the Illinois Department of Corrections. The court shall cause the Department of Corrections to be notified of such sentence at the time of commitment and to be provided with copies of all records regarding the sentence.

(f) A defendant who has a previous and unexpired sentence of imprisonment imposed by an Illinois circuit court for a crime in this State and who is subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment by another state or by any district court of the United States and who has served a term of imprisonment imposed by the other state or district court of the United States, and must return to serve the unexpired prior sentence imposed by the Illinois Circuit Court may apply to the court which imposed sentence to have his sentence reduced.

The circuit court may order that any time served on the sentence imposed by the other state or district court of the United States be credited on his Illinois sentence. Such application for reduction of a sentence under this subsection (f) shall be made within 30 days after the defendant has completed the sentence imposed by the other state or district court of the United States.

(Source: P.A. 94-165, eff. 7-11-05; 94-243, eff. 1-1-06; 94-715, eff. 12-13-05.)

ARTICLE II. AMENDATORY PROVISIONS

Section 2-5. The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 is amended by changing Section 2-13.1 as follows:

(705 ILCS 405/2-13.1)

Sec. 2-13.1. Early termination of reasonable efforts.

(1) (a) In conjunction with, or at any time subsequent to, the filing of a petition on behalf of a minor in accordance with Section 2-13 of this Act, the State's Attorney, the guardian ad litem, or the Department of Children and Family Services may file a motion requesting a finding that reasonable efforts to reunify that minor with his or her parent or parents are no longer required and are to cease.

(b) The court shall grant this motion with respect to a parent of the minor if the court finds after a hearing that the parent has:

(i) had his or her parental rights to another child of the parent involuntarily terminated; or

(ii) been convicted of:

(A) first degree or second degree murder of any another child of the parent;

(B) (blank); attempt or conspiracy to commit first degree or second degree murder of another child of the parent;

(C) (blank); solicitation to commit murder of another child of the parent, solicitation to commit murder for hire of another child of the parent, or solicitation to commit second degree murder of another child of the parent;

(D) aggravated battery, aggravated battery of a child, or felony domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, or heinous battery, any of which has resulted in serious bodily injury to the minor or another child of the parent; or

(D-1) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if the victim is the minor or another child of the parent;

(D-2) female genital mutilation of a child if the victim is the minor or another child of the parent;

((D-3) attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the above offenses;

(D-4) solicitation to commit murder of any child of the parent, solicitation to commit murder for hire of any child of the parent, or solicitation to commit second degree murder of any child of the parent;

(E) an offense in any other state the elements of which are similar and bear substantial relationship to any of the foregoing offenses unless the court sets forth in writing a compelling reason why terminating reasonable efforts to reunify the minor with the parent would not be in the best interests of that minor.

(c) The court shall also grant this motion with respect to a parent of the minor if:

(i) after a hearing it determines that further reunification services would no longer be appropriate, and

(ii) a dispositional hearing has already taken place.

(2) (a) The court shall hold a permanency hearing within 30 days of granting a motion pursuant to this subsection. If an adjudicatory or a dispositional hearing, or both, has not taken place when the court grants a motion pursuant to this Section, then either or both hearings shall be held as needed so that both take place on or before the date a permanency hearing is held pursuant to this subsection.

(b) Following a permanency hearing held pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection, the appointed custodian or guardian of the minor shall make reasonable efforts to place the child in accordance with the permanency plan and goal set by the court, and to complete the necessary steps to locate and finalize a permanent placement.

(Source: P.A. 90-608, eff. 6-30-98.)

Section 2-10. The Criminal Code of 1961 is amended by changing Sections 12-3.2 and 12-30 as follows:

(720 ILCS 5/12-3.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 12-3.2)

Sec. 12-3.2. Domestic Battery.

(a) A person commits domestic battery if he intentionally or knowingly without legal justification by any means:

(1) Causes bodily harm to any family or household member as defined in subsection (3) of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, as amended;

(2) Makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any family or household member as defined in subsection (3) of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, as amended.

(b) Sentence. Domestic battery is a Class A misdemeanor. Domestic battery is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction under this Code for any of the following offenses when any of these offenses have been committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963:

(i) domestic battery (Section 12-3.2), or

(ii) violation of an order of protection (Section 12-30), or any prior conviction under the law of another jurisdiction for an offense which is substantially similar. Domestic battery is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction under this Code

(iii) for first degree murder (Section 9-1),

(iv) attempt to commit first degree murder (Section 8-4),

(v) aggravated domestic battery (Section 12-3.3),

(vi) aggravated battery (Section 12-4),

(vii) heinous battery (Section 12-4.1),

(viii) aggravated battery with a firearm (Section 12-4.2),

(ix) aggravated battery of a child (Section 12-4.3),

(x) aggravated battery of an unborn child (Section 12-4.4),

(xi) aggravated battery of a senior citizen (Section 12-4.6),

(xii) stalking (Section 12-7.3),

(xiii) cyberstalking (Section 12-7.5),

(xiv) aggravated stalking (Section 12-7.4),

(xv) criminal sexual assault (Section 12-13), or

(xvi) aggravated criminal sexual assault (12-14),

(xvii) kidnapping (Section 10-1),

(xviii) aggravated kidnapping (Section 10-2),

(xix) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (Section 12-14.1),

(xx) aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Section 12-16),

(xxi) unlawful restraint (Section 10-3),

(xxii) aggravated unlawful restraint (Section 10-3.1),

(xxiii) aggravated arson (Section 20-1.1), or

(xxiv) aggravated discharge of a firearm (Section 24-1.2), or

(xxv) home invasion (Section 12-11), or

(xxvi) any prior conviction under the law of another jurisdiction for any offense that is substantially similar to the offenses listed in this Section, when any of these offenses have been committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

In addition to any other sentencing alternatives, for any second or subsequent conviction of violating this Section, the offender shall be mandatorily sentenced to a minimum of 72 consecutive hours of imprisonment. The imprisonment shall not be subject to suspension, nor shall the person be eligible for probation in order to reduce the sentence.

(c) Domestic battery committed in the presence of a child. In addition to any other sentencing alternatives, a defendant who commits, in the presence of a child, a felony domestic battery (enhanced under subsection (b)), aggravated domestic battery (Section 12-3.3), aggravated battery (Section 12-4), unlawful restraint (Section 10-3), or aggravated unlawful restraint (Section 10-3.1) against a family or household member, as defined in Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, shall be required to serve a mandatory minimum imprisonment of 10 days or perform 300 hours of community service, or both. The defendant shall further be liable for the cost of any counseling required for the child at the discretion of the court in accordance with subsection (b) of Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. For purposes of this Section, "child" means a person under 18 years of age who is the defendant's or victim's child or step-child or who is a minor child residing within or visiting the household of the defendant or victim. For purposes of this Section, "in the presence of a child" means in the physical presence of a child or knowing or having reason to know that a child is present and may see or hear an act constituting one of the offenses listed in this subsection.

(Source: P.A. 93-336, eff. 1-1-04; 93-809, eff. 1-1-05; 94-148, eff. 1-1-06.)

(720 ILCS 5/12-30) (from Ch. 38, par. 12-30)

Sec. 12-30. Violation of an order of protection.

(a) A person commits violation of an order of protection if:

(1) He or she commits an act which was prohibited by a court or fails to commit an act which was ordered by a court in violation of:

(i) a remedy in a valid order of protection authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (14), or (14.5) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986,

(ii) a remedy, which is substantially similar to the remedies authorized under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (14) or (14.5) of subsection (b) of Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, in a valid order of protection, which is authorized under the laws of another state, tribe or United States territory,

(iii) any other remedy when the act constitutes a crime against the protected parties as the term protected parties is defined in Section 112A-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; and

(2) Such violation occurs after the offender has been served notice of the contents of the order, pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or any substantially similar statute of another state, tribe or United States territory, or otherwise has acquired actual knowledge of the contents of the order.

An order of protection issued by a state, tribal or territorial court related to domestic or family violence shall be deemed valid if the issuing court had jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of the state, tribe or territory. There shall be a presumption of validity where an order is certified and appears authentic on its face.

(a-5) Failure to provide reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be an affirmative defense to any charge or process filed seeking enforcement of a foreign order of protection.

(b) For purposes of this Section, an "order of protection" may have been issued in a criminal or civil proceeding.

(c) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to diminish the inherent authority of the courts to enforce their lawful orders through civil or criminal contempt proceedings.

(d) Violation of an order of protection under subsection (a) of this Section is a Class A misdemeanor. Violation of an order of protection under subsection (a) of this Section is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction for any of the following offenses when these offenses have been committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963: under this Code

(i) for domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-3.2), or

(ii) violation of an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-30), . Violation of an order of protection is a Class 4 felony if the defendant has any prior conviction under this Code for

(iii) first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/ Section 9-1),

(iv) attempt to commit first degree murder (Section 8-4),

(v) aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-3.3),

(vi) aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-4),

(vii heinous battery (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-4.1),

(viii) aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-4.2),

(ix) aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-4.3),

(x) aggravated battery of an unborn child (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-4.4),

(xi) aggravated battery of a senior citizen ((720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-4.6),

(xii) stalking ((720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-7.3),

(xiii)cyberstalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.5),

(xiv) aggravated stalking (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-7.4),

(xv) criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-13),

(xvi) aggravated criminal sexual assault (12-14),

(xvii) kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/ Section 10-1),

(xviii) aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/ Section 10-2),

(xix) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-14.1),

(xx) aggravated criminal sexual abuse ((720 ILCS 5/ Section 12-16),

(xxi) unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/ Section 10-3),

(xxii) aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/ Section 10-3.1),

(xxiii) aggravated arson (720 ILCS 5/ Section 20-1.1),

(xxiv) or aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/ Section 24-1.2),

(xxvi) telephone harassment or harassment through electronic communications, if the prior conviction is a felony (720 ILCS 135/2(b)),

(xxvii) home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11), or

(xxviii) any offense in any other state the elements of which are similar and bear a substantial relationship to any of the foregoing offenses.

when any of these offenses have been committed against a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. The court shall impose a minimum penalty of 24 hours imprisonment for defendant's second or subsequent violation of any order of protection; unless the court explicitly finds that an increased penalty or such period of imprisonment would be manifestly unjust. In addition to any other penalties, the court may order the defendant to pay a fine as authorized under Section 5-9-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections or to make restitution to the victim under Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. In addition to any other penalties, including those imposed by Section 5-9-1.5 of the Unified Code of Corrections, the court shall impose an additional fine of $20 as authorized by Section 5-9-1.11 of the Unified Code of Corrections upon any person convicted of or placed on supervision for a violation of this Section. The additional fine shall be imposed for each violation of this Section.

(e) The limitations placed on law enforcement liability by Section 305 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 apply to actions taken under this Section.

(Source: P.A. 91-112, eff. 10-1-99; 91-357, eff. 7-29-99; 92-827, eff. 8-22-02.)

Section 2-15. The Harassing and Obscene Communications Act is amended by changing Section 2 as follows:

(720 ILCS 135/2) (from Ch. 134, par. 16.5)

Sec. 2. Sentence.

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who violates any of the provisions of Section 1, 1-1, or 1-2 of this Act is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. Except as provided in subsection (b), a second or subsequent violation of Section 1, 1-1, or 1-2 of this Act is a Class A misdemeanor, for which the court shall impose a minimum of 14 days in jail or, if public or community service is established in the county in which the offender was convicted, 240 hours of public or community service.

(b) In any of the following circumstances, a person who violates Section 1, 1-1, or 1-2 of this Act shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony:

(1) The person has 3 or more prior violations in the last 10 years of harassment by telephone under Section 1-1 of this Act, harassment through electronic communications under Section 1-2 of this Act, or any similar offense of any state;

(2) The person has previously violated the harassment by telephone provisions of Section 1-1 of this Act or the harassment through electronic communications provisions of Section 1-2 of this Act or committed any similar offense in any state with the same victim or a member of the victim's family or household;

(3) At the time of the offense, the offender was under conditions of bail, probation, mandatory supervised release or was the subject of an order of protection, in this or any other state, prohibiting contact with the victim or any member of the victim's family or household;

(4) In the course of the offense, the offender threatened to kill the victim or any member of the victim's family or household;

(5) The person has been convicted in the last 10 years of a forcible felony as defined in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961; or

(6) The person violates paragraph (4.1) of Section 1-1 or paragraph (3.1) of subsection (a) of Section 1-2.

(7) The person has a prior conviction for:

(i) violation of an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12-30);

(ii) stalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3);

(iii) aggravated stalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.4);

(iv) cyberstalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.5);

(v) home invasion, when the victim was a family or household member as defined in Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; or

(iv) any offense in any other state the elements of which are similar and bear a substantial relationship to any of the foregoing offenses.

(Source: P.A. 90-578, eff. 6-1-98; 91-878, eff. 1-1-01.)

Section 2-20 The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is amended by changing Sections 115-7 and 115-10.2 as follows:

(725 ILCS 5/115-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 115-7)

Sec. 115-7. a. In prosecutions for

(i) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,

(ii) aggravated criminal sexual assault,

(iii) criminal sexual assault,

(iv) aggravated criminal sexual abuse,

(v) criminal sexual abuse, or

(vi) criminal transmission of HIV, ; and in prosecutions for

(vii) battery and aggravated battery, when the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 12-12 of the Criminal Code of 1961, ; and with the trial or retrial of

(viii) the offenses formerly known as rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child,

(ix) solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses, the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.

b. No evidence admissible under this Section shall be introduced unless ruled admissible by the trial judge after an offer of proof has been made at a hearing to be held in camera in order to determine whether the defense has evidence to impeach the witness in the event that prior sexual activity with the defendant is denied. Such offer of proof shall include reasonably specific information as to the date, time and place of the past sexual conduct between the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code and the defendant. Unless the court finds that reasonably specific information as to date, time or place, or some combination thereof, has been offered as to prior sexual activity with the defendant, counsel for the defendant shall be ordered to refrain from inquiring into prior sexual activity between the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code and the defendant. The court shall not admit evidence under this Section unless it determines at the hearing that the evidence is relevant and the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence shall be admissible at trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies the evidence that may be admitted and areas with respect to which the alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code may be examined or cross examined.

c. This amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly is declarative of existing law.

(Source: P.A. 89-428, eff. 12-13-95; 89-462, eff. 5-29-96; 90-132, eff. 1-1-98.)

(725 ILCS 5/115-10.2)

Sec. 115-10.2. Admissibility of prior statements when witness refused to testify despite a court order to testify.

(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that:

(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and

(2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant.

(c) Unavailability as a witness is limited to the situation in which the declarant persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so.

(d) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim or lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section.

(f) Prior statements of a testimonial nature are admissible under this Section only if the statements were made under oath and were subject to cross-examination by the adverse party in a prior trial, hearing, or other proceeding.

(g) This Amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly is declarative of existing law.

(Source: P.A. 93-413, eff. 8-5-03; 93-443, eff. 8-5-03; 94-53, eff. 6-17-05.)

Section 2-25. The Adoption Act is amended by changing Section 1 as follows:

(750 ILCS 50/1) (from Ch. 40, par. 1501)

Sec. 1. Definitions. When used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:

A. "Child" means a person under legal age subject to adoption under this Act.

B. "Related child" means a child subject to adoption where either or both of the adopting parents stands in any of the following relationships to the child by blood or marriage: parent, grand-parent, brother, sister, step-parent, step-grandparent, step-brother, step-sister, uncle, aunt, great-uncle, great-aunt, or cousin of first degree. A child whose parent has executed a final irrevocable consent to adoption or a final irrevocable surrender for purposes of adoption, or whose parent has had his or her parental rights terminated, is not a related child to that person, unless the consent is determined to be void or is void pursuant to subsection O of Section 10.

C. "Agency" for the purpose of this Act means a public child welfare agency or a licensed child welfare agency.

D. "Unfit person" means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following, except that a person shall not be considered an unfit person for the sole reason that the person has relinquished a child in accordance with the Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act:

(a) Abandonment of the child.

(a-1) Abandonment of a newborn infant in a hospital.

(a-2) Abandonment of a newborn infant in any setting where the evidence suggests that the parent intended to relinquish his or her parental rights.

(b) Failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare.

(c) Desertion of the child for more than 3 months next preceding the commencement of the Adoption proceeding.

(d) Substantial neglect of the child if continuous or repeated.

(d-1) Substantial neglect, if continuous or repeated, of any child residing in the household which resulted in the death of that child.

(e) Extreme or repeated cruelty to the child.

(f) Two or more findings of physical abuse to any children under Section 4-8 of the Juvenile Court Act or Section 2-21 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the most recent of which was determined by the juvenile court hearing the matter to be supported by clear and convincing evidence; a criminal conviction or a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity resulting from the death of any child by physical child abuse; or a finding of physical child abuse resulting from the death of any child under Section 4-8 of the Juvenile Court Act or Section 2-21 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.

(g) Failure to protect the child from conditions within his environment injurious to the child's welfare.

(h) Other neglect of, or misconduct toward the child; provided that in making a finding of unfitness the court hearing the adoption proceeding shall not be bound by any previous finding, order or judgment affecting or determining the rights of the parents toward the child sought to be adopted in any other proceeding except such proceedings terminating parental rights as shall be had under either this Act, the Juvenile Court Act or the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.

(i) Depravity. Conviction of any one of the following crimes shall create a presumption that a parent is depraved which can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence: (1) first degree murder in violation of paragraph 1 or 2 of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or conviction of second degree murder in violation of subsection (a) of Section 9-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 of a parent of the child to be adopted; (2) first degree murder or second degree murder of any child in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961; (3) (blank); attempt or conspiracy to commit first degree murder or second degree murder of any child in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961; (4) (blank); solicitation to commit murder of any child, solicitation to commit murder of any child for hire, or solicitation to commit second degree murder of any child in violation of the Criminal Code of 1961; or (5) aggravated criminal sexual assault in violation of Section 12-14(b)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961; (6) heinous battery of any child; (7) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; (8) female genital mutilation of any child; (9) solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt to commit any of the above offenses listed in this clause (i); or (10) solicitation to commit murder of any child, or solicitation to commit murder of any child for hire.

There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved if the parent has been criminally convicted of at least 3 felonies under the laws of this State or any other state, or under federal law, or the criminal laws of any United States territory; and at least one of these convictions took place within 5 years of the filing of the petition or motion seeking termination of parental rights.

There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved if that parent has been criminally convicted of either first or second degree murder of any person as defined in the Criminal Code of 1961 within 10 years of the filing date of the petition or motion to terminate parental rights.

(j) Open and notorious adultery or fornication.

(j-1) (Blank).

(k) Habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs, other than those prescribed by a physician, for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitness proceeding.

There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is unfit under this subsection with respect to any child to which that parent gives birth where there is a confirmed test result that at birth the child's blood, urine, or meconium contained any amount of a controlled substance as defined in subsection (f) of Section 102 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or metabolites of such substances, the presence of which in the newborn infant was not the result of medical treatment administered to the mother or the newborn infant; and the biological mother of this child is the biological mother of at least one other child who was adjudicated a neglected minor under subsection (c) of Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.

(l) Failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a new born child during the first 30 days after its birth.

(m) Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent, or (ii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent within 9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of that Act, or (iii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period after the end of the initial 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of that Act. If a service plan has been established as required under Section 8.2 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent and if those services were available, then, for purposes of this Act, "failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent" includes (I) the parent's failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that brought the child into care within 9 months after the adjudication under Section 2-3 or 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and (II) the parent's failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that brought the child into care during any 9-month period after the end of the initial 9-month period following the adjudication under Section 2-3 or 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. Notwithstanding any other provision, when a petition or motion seeks to terminate parental rights on the basis of item (iii) of this subsection (m), the petitioner shall file with the court and serve on the parties a pleading that specifies the 9-month period or periods relied on. The pleading shall be filed and served on the parties no later than 3 weeks before the date set by the court for closure of discovery, and the allegations in the pleading shall be treated as incorporated into the petition or motion. Failure of a respondent to file a written denial of the allegations in the pleading shall not be treated as an admission that the allegations are true.

(m-1) Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, a child has been in foster care for 15 months out of any 22 month period which begins on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1998 unless the child's parent can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that it will be in the best interests of the child to be returned to the parent within 6 months of the date on which a petition for termination of parental rights is filed under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. The 15 month time limit is tolled during any period for which there is a court finding that the appointed custodian or guardian failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his or her family, provided that (i) the finding of no reasonable efforts is made within 60 days of the period when reasonable efforts were not made or (ii) the parent filed a motion requesting a finding of no reasonable efforts within 60 days of the period when reasonable efforts were not made. For purposes of this subdivision (m-1), the date of entering foster care is the earlier of: (i) the date of a judicial finding at an adjudicatory hearing that the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent minor; or (ii) 60 days after the date on which the child is removed from his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian.

(n) Evidence of intent to forgo his or her parental rights, whether or not the child is a ward of the court, (1) as manifested by his or her failure for a period of 12 months: (i) to visit the child, (ii) to communicate with the child or agency, although able to do so and not prevented from doing so by an agency or by court order, or (iii) to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically able to do so, or (2) as manifested by the father's failure, where he and the mother of the child were unmarried to each other at the time of the child's birth, (i) to commence legal proceedings to establish his paternity under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 or the law of the jurisdiction of the child's birth within 30 days of being informed, pursuant to Section 12a of this Act, that he is the father or the likely father of the child or, after being so informed where the child is not yet born, within 30 days of the child's birth, or (ii) to make a good faith effort to pay a reasonable amount of the expenses related to the birth of the child and to provide a reasonable amount for the financial support of the child, the court to consider in its determination all relevant circumstances, including the financial condition of both parents; provided that the ground for termination provided in this subparagraph (n)(2)(ii) shall only be available where the petition is brought by the mother or the husband of the mother.

Contact or communication by a parent with his or her child that does not demonstrate affection and concern does not constitute reasonable contact and planning under subdivision (n). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the ability to visit, communicate, maintain contact, pay expenses and plan for the future shall be presumed. The subjective intent of the parent, whether expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of the foregoing parental acts manifesting that intent, shall not preclude a determination that the parent has intended to forgo his or her parental rights. In making this determination, the court may consider but shall not require a showing of diligent efforts by an authorized agency to encourage the parent to perform the acts specified in subdivision (n).

It shall be an affirmative defense to any allegation under paragraph (2) of this subsection that the father's failure was due to circumstances beyond his control or to impediments created by the mother or any other person having legal custody. Proof of that fact need only be by a preponderance of the evidence.

(o) Repeated or continuous failure by the parents, although physically and financially able, to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, or shelter.

(p) Inability to discharge parental responsibilities supported by competent evidence from a psychiatrist, licensed clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist of mental impairment, mental illness or mental retardation as defined in Section 1-116 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, or developmental disability as defined in Section 1-106 of that Code, and there is sufficient justification to believe that the inability to discharge parental responsibilities shall extend beyond a reasonable time period. However, this subdivision (p) shall not be construed so as to permit a licensed clinical social worker to conduct any medical diagnosis to determine mental illness or mental impairment.

(q) The parent has been criminally convicted of aggravated battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child.

(r) The child is in the temporary custody or guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services, the parent is incarcerated as a result of criminal conviction at the time the petition or motion for termination of parental rights is filed, prior to incarceration the parent had little or no contact with the child or provided little or no support for the child, and the parent's incarceration will prevent the parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the child for a period in excess of 2 years after the filing of the petition or motion for termination of parental rights.

(s) The child is in the temporary custody or guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services, the parent is incarcerated at the time the petition or motion for termination of parental rights is filed, the parent has been repeatedly incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions, and the parent's repeated incarceration has prevented the parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the child.

(t) A finding that at birth the child's blood, urine, or meconium contained any amount of a controlled substance as defined in subsection (f) of Section 102 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or a metabolite of a controlled substance, with the exception of controlled substances or metabolites of such substances, the presence of which in the newborn infant was the result of medical treatment administered to the mother or the newborn infant, and that the biological mother of this child is the biological mother of at least one other child who was adjudicated a neglected minor under subsection (c) of Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, after which the biological mother had the opportunity to enroll in and participate in a clinically appropriate substance abuse counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation program.

E. "Parent" means the father or mother of a lawful child of the parties or child born out of wedlock. For the purpose of this Act, a person who has executed a final and irrevocable consent to adoption or a final and irrevocable surrender for purposes of adoption, or whose parental rights have been terminated by a court, is not a parent of the child who was the subject of the consent or surrender, unless the consent is void pursuant to subsection O of Section 10.

F. A person is available for adoption when the person is:

(a) a child who has been surrendered for adoption to an agency and to whose adoption the agency has thereafter consented;

(b) a child to whose adoption a person authorized by law, other than his parents, has consented, or to whose adoption no consent is required pursuant to Section 8 of this Act;

(c) a child who is in the custody of persons who intend to adopt him through placement made by his parents;

(c-1) a child for whom a parent has signed a specific consent pursuant to subsection O of Section 10;

(d) an adult who meets the conditions set forth in Section 3 of this Act; or

(e) a child who has been relinquished as defined in Section 10 of the Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act.

A person who would otherwise be available for adoption shall not be deemed unavailable for adoption solely by reason of his or her death.

G. The singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular and the "male" includes the "female", as the context of this Act may require.

H. "Adoption disruption" occurs when an adoptive placement does not prove successful and it becomes necessary for the child to be removed from placement before the adoption is finalized.

I. "Foreign placing agency" is an agency or individual operating in a country or territory outside the United States that is authorized by its country to place children for adoption either directly with families in the United States or through United States based international agencies.

J. "Immediate relatives" means the biological parents, the parents of the biological parents and siblings of the biological parents.

K. "Intercountry adoption" is a process by which a child from a country other than the United States is adopted.

L. "Intercountry Adoption Coordinator" is a staff person of the Department of Children and Family Services appointed by the Director to coordinate the provision of services by the public and private sector to prospective parents of foreign-born children.

M. "Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children" is a law enacted by most states for the purpose of establishing uniform procedures for handling the interstate placement of children in foster homes, adoptive homes, or other child care facilities.

N. "Non-Compact state" means a state that has not enacted the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

O. "Preadoption requirements" are any conditions established by the laws or regulations of the Federal Government or of each state that must be met prior to the placement of a child in an adoptive home.

P. "Abused child" means a child whose parent or immediate family member, or any person responsible for the child's welfare, or any individual residing in the same home as the child, or a paramour of the child's parent:

(a) inflicts, causes to be inflicted, or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical injury, by other than accidental means, that causes death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function;

(b) creates a substantial risk of physical injury to the child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function;

(c) commits or allows to be committed any sex offense against the child, as sex offenses are defined in the Criminal Code of 1961 and extending those definitions of sex offenses to include children under 18 years of age;

(d) commits or allows to be committed an act or acts of torture upon the child; or

(e) inflicts excessive corporal punishment.

Q. "Neglected child" means any child whose parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare withholds or denies nourishment or medically indicated treatment including food or care denied solely on the basis of the present or anticipated mental or physical impairment as determined by a physician acting alone or in consultation with other physicians or otherwise does not provide the proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for a child's well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being, including adequate food, clothing and shelter; or who is abandoned by his or her parents or other person responsible for the child's welfare.

A child shall not be considered neglected or abused for the sole reason that the child's parent or other person responsible for his or her welfare depends upon spiritual means through prayer alone for the treatment or cure of disease or remedial care as provided under Section 4 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. A child shall not be considered neglected or abused for the sole reason that the child's parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare failed to vaccinate, delayed vaccination, or refused vaccination for the child due to a waiver on religious or medical grounds as permitted by law.

R. "Putative father" means a man who may be a child's father, but who (1) is not married to the child's mother on or before the date that the child was or is to be born and (2) has not established paternity of the child in a court proceeding before the filing of a petition for the adoption of the child. The term includes a male who is less than 18 years of age. "Putative father" does not mean a man who is the child's father as a result of criminal sexual abuse or assault as defined under Article 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

S. "Standby adoption" means an adoption in which a parent consents to custody and termination of parental rights to become effective upon the occurrence of a future event, which is either the death of the parent or the request of the parent for the entry of a final judgment of adoption.

T. (Blank).

(Source: P.A. 93-732, eff. 1-1-05; 94-229, eff. 1-1-06; 94-563, eff. 1-1-06; revised 8-23-05.)