SB1200 104TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LRB104 03905 RLC 13929 b

104TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2025 and 2026
SB1200

Introduced 1/24/2025, by Sen. Andrew S. Chesney

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:

New Act
5 ILCS 140/7.5
30 ILCS 105/5.1030 new
725 ILCS 5/113-3	from Ch. 38, par. 113-3
725 ILCS 5/119-1
725 ILCS 105/10	from Ch. 38, par. 208-10
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1	from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1

Creates the Capital Crimes Litigation Act of 2025. Provides that all unobligated and unexpended moneys remaining in the Death Penalty Abolition Fund on the effective date of the amendatory Act shall be transferred into the Capital Litigation Trust Fund which is re-established as a special fund in the State treasury. Amends the State Appellate Defender Act. Provides that in cases in which a death sentence is an authorized disposition, the State Appellate Defender shall provide trial counsel with legal assistance and the assistance of expert witnesses, investigators, and mitigation specialists from funds appropriated to the State Appellate Defender specifically for that purpose by the General Assembly. Provides that the Office of State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases. Amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Eliminates a provision that abolishes the sentence of death. Amends the Unified code of Corrections relating to first degree murder. Adds and eliminates aggravating factors for which the death penalty may be imposed. Amends the State Finance Act to make conforming changes. Effective January 1, 2026.

A BILL FOR

AN ACT concerning criminal law.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

Section 1. Short title. This Act may be cited as the Capital Crimes Litigation Act of 2025.

Section 5. Appointment of trial counsel in death penalty cases. If an indigent defendant is charged with an offense for which a sentence of death is authorized, and the State's Attorney has not, at or before arraignment, filed a certificate indicating he or she will not seek the death penalty or stated on the record in open court that the death penalty will not be sought, the trial court shall immediately appoint the Public Defender, or any other qualified attorney or attorneys as the Illinois Supreme Court shall by rule provide, to represent the defendant as trial counsel. If the Public Defender is appointed, he or she shall immediately assign the attorney or attorneys who are public defenders to represent the defendant. The counsel shall meet the qualifications as the Supreme Court shall by rule provide. At the request of court appointed counsel in a case in which the death penalty is sought, attorneys employed by the State Appellate Defender may enter an appearance for the limited purpose of assisting counsel appointed under this Section.

Section 10. Court appointed trial counsel; compensation and expenses.

(a) This Section applies only to compensation and expenses of trial counsel appointed by the court as set forth in Section 5, other than public defenders, for the period after arraignment and so long as the State's Attorney has not, at any time, filed a certificate indicating he or she will not seek the death penalty or stated on the record in open court that the death penalty will not be sought.

(a-5) Litigation budget.

(1) In a case in which the State has filed a statement of intent to seek the death penalty, the court shall require appointed counsel, including those appointed in Cook County, after counsel has had adequate time to review the case and prior to engaging trial assistance, to submit a proposed estimated litigation budget for court approval, that will be subject to modification in light of facts and developments that emerge as the case proceeds. Case budgets should be submitted ex parte and filed and maintained under seal in order to protect the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, right not to incriminate him or herself and all applicable privileges. Case budgets shall be reviewed and approved by the judge assigned to try the case. As provided under subsection (c) of this Section, petitions for compensation shall be reviewed by both the trial judge and the presiding judge or the presiding judge's designee.

(2) The litigation budget shall serve purposes comparable to those of private retainer agreements by confirming both the court's and the attorney's expectations regarding fees and expenses. Consideration should be given to employing an ex parte pretrial conference in order to facilitate reaching agreement on a litigation budget at the earliest opportunity.

(3) The budget shall be incorporated into a sealed initial pretrial order that reflects the understandings of the court and counsel regarding all matters affecting counsel compensation and reimbursement and payments for investigative, expert and other services, including, but not limited to, the following matters:

(A) the hourly rate at which counsel will be compensated;

(B) the hourly rate at which private investigators, other than investigators employed by the Office of the State Appellate Defender, will be compensated; and

(C) the best preliminary estimate that can be made of the cost of all services, including, but not limited to, counsel, expert, and investigative services, that are likely to be needed through the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. The court shall have discretion to require that budgets be prepared for shorter intervals of time.

(4) Appointed counsel may obtain, subject to later review, investigative, expert or other services without prior authorization if necessary for an adequate defense. If the services are obtained, the presiding judge or the presiding judge's designee shall consider in an ex parte proceeding that timely procurement of necessary services could not await prior authorization. If an ex parte hearing is requested by defense counsel or deemed necessary by the trial judge prior to modifying a budget, the ex parte hearing shall be before the presiding judge or the presiding judge's designee. The judge may then authorize the services nunc pro tunc. If the presiding judge or the presiding judge's designee finds that the services were not reasonable, payment may be denied.

(5) An approved budget shall guide counsel's use of time and resources by indicating the services for which compensation is authorized. The case budget shall be re-evaluated when justified by changed or unexpected circumstances and shall be modified by the court when reasonable and necessary for an adequate defense. If an ex parte hearing is requested by defense counsel or deemed necessary by the trial judge prior to modifying a budget, the ex parte hearing shall be before the presiding judge or the presiding judge's designee.

(b) Appointed trial counsel shall be compensated upon presentment and certification by the circuit court of a claim for services detailing the date, activity, and time duration for which compensation is sought. Compensation for appointed trial counsel may be paid at a reasonable rate not to exceed $125 per hour. The court shall not authorize payment of bills that are not properly itemized. A request for payment shall be presented under seal and reviewed ex parte with a court reporter present. Every January 20, the statutory rate prescribed in this subsection shall be automatically increased or decreased, as applicable, by a percentage equal to the percentage change in the consumer price index-u during the preceding 12-month calendar year. "Consumer price index-u" means the index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor that measures the average change in prices of goods and services purchased by all urban consumers, United States city average, all items, 1982-84=100. The new rate resulting from each annual adjustment shall be determined by the State Treasurer and made available to the chief judge of each judicial circuit.

(c) Appointed trial counsel may also petition the court for certification of expenses for reasonable and necessary capital litigation expenses including, but not limited to, investigatory and other assistance, expert, forensic, and other witnesses, and mitigation specialists. Each provider of proposed services must specify the best preliminary estimate that can be made in light of information received in the case at that point, and the provider must sign this estimate under the provisions of Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A provider of proposed services must also specify: (1) his or her hourly rate; (2) the hourly rate of anyone else in his or her employ for whom reimbursement is sought; and (3) the hourly rate of any person or entity that may be subcontracted to perform these services. Counsel may not petition for certification of expenses that may have been provided or compensated by the State Appellate Defender under item (c)(5.1) of Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act. The petitions shall be filed under seal and considered ex parte but with a court reporter present for all ex parte conferences. If the requests are submitted after services have been rendered, the requests shall be supported by an invoice describing the services rendered, the dates the services were performed and the amount of time spent. These petitions shall be reviewed by both the trial judge and the presiding judge of the circuit court or the presiding judge's designee. The petitions and orders shall be kept under seal and shall be exempt from Freedom of Information requests until the conclusion of the trial, even if the prosecution chooses not to pursue the death penalty prior to trial or sentencing. If an ex parte hearing is requested by defense counsel or deemed necessary by the trial judge, the hearing shall be before the presiding judge or the presiding judge's designee.

(d) Appointed trial counsel shall petition the court for certification of compensation and expenses under this Section periodically during the course of counsel's representation. The petitions shall be supported by itemized bills showing the date, the amount of time spent, the work done and the total being charged for each entry. The court shall not authorize payment of bills that are not properly itemized. The court must certify reasonable and necessary expenses of the petitioner for travel and per diem (lodging, meals, and incidental expenses). These expenses must be paid at the rate as promulgated by the United States General Services Administration for these expenses for the date and location in which they were incurred, unless extraordinary reasons are shown for the difference. The petitions shall be filed under seal and considered ex parte but with a court reporter present for all ex parte conferences. The petitions shall be reviewed by both the trial judge and the presiding judge of the circuit court or the presiding judge's designee. If an ex parte hearing is requested by defense counsel or deemed necessary by the trial judge, the ex parte hearing shall be before the presiding judge or the presiding judge's designee. If the court determines that the compensation and expenses should be paid from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, the court shall certify, on a form created by the State Treasurer, that all or a designated portion of the amount requested is reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund. The form must also be signed by lead trial counsel under the provisions of Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure verifying that the amount requested is reasonable, necessary, and appropriate. Bills submitted for payment by any individual or entity seeking payment from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund must also be accompanied by a form created by the State Treasurer and signed by the individual or responsible agent of the entity under the provisions of Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the amount requested is accurate and truthful and reflects time spent or expenses incurred. Certification of compensation and expenses by a court in any county other than Cook County shall be delivered by the court to the State Treasurer and must be paid by the State Treasurer directly from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund if there are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to pay the compensation and expenses. If the State Treasurer finds within 14 days of his or her receipt of a certification that the compensation and expenses to be paid are unreasonable, unnecessary, or inappropriate, he or she may return the certification to the court setting forth in detail the objection or objections with a request for the court to review the objection or objections before resubmitting the certification. The State Treasurer must send the claimant a copy of the objection or objections. The State Treasurer may only seek a review of a specific objection once. The claimant has 7 days from his or her receipt of the objections to file a response with the court. With or without further hearing, the court must promptly rule on the objections. The petitions and orders shall be kept under seal and shall be exempt from Freedom of Information requests until the conclusion of the trial and appeal of the case, even if the prosecution chooses not to pursue the death penalty prior to trial or sentencing. Certification of compensation and expenses by a court in Cook County shall be delivered by the court to the county treasurer and paid by the county treasurer from moneys granted to the county from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund.

Section 15. Capital Litigation Trust Fund.

(a) The Capital Litigation Trust Fund is created as a special fund in the State Treasury. The Trust Fund shall be administered by the State Treasurer to provide moneys for the appropriations to be made, grants to be awarded, and compensation and expenses to be paid under this Act. All interest earned from the investment or deposit of moneys accumulated in the Trust Fund shall, under Section 4.1 of the State Finance Act, be deposited into the Trust Fund.

(b) Moneys deposited into the Trust Fund shall not be considered general revenue of the State of Illinois.

(c) Moneys deposited into the Trust Fund shall be used exclusively for the purposes of providing funding for the prosecution and defense of capital cases and for providing funding for post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases as provided in this Act and shall not be appropriated, loaned, or in any manner transferred to the General Revenue Fund of the State of Illinois.

(d) Every fiscal year the State Treasurer shall transfer from the General Revenue Fund to the Capital Litigation Trust Fund an amount equal to the full amount of moneys appropriated by the General Assembly (both by original and supplemental appropriation), less any unexpended balance from the previous fiscal year, from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund for the specific purpose of making funding available for the prosecution and defense of capital cases and for the litigation expenses associated with post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases. The Public Defender and State's Attorney in Cook County, the State Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, and the Attorney General shall make annual requests for appropriations from the Trust Fund.

(1) The Public Defender in Cook County shall request appropriations to the State Treasurer for expenses incurred by the Public Defender and for funding for private appointed defense counsel in Cook County.

(2) The State's Attorney in Cook County shall request an appropriation to the State Treasurer for expenses incurred by the State's Attorney.

(3) The State Appellate Defender shall request a direct appropriation from the Trust Fund for expenses incurred by the State Appellate Defender in providing assistance to trial attorneys under item (c)(5.1) of Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act and for expenses incurred by the State Appellate Defender in representing petitioners in capital cases in post-conviction proceedings under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases and for the representation of those petitioners by attorneys approved by or contracted with the State Appellate Defender and an appropriation to the State Treasurer for payments from the Trust Fund for the defense of cases in counties other than Cook County.

(4) The State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor shall request a direct appropriation from the Trust Fund to pay expenses incurred by the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor and an appropriation to the State Treasurer for payments from the Trust Fund for expenses incurred by State's Attorneys in counties other than Cook County.

(5) The Attorney General shall request a direct appropriation from the Trust Fund to pay expenses incurred by the Attorney General in assisting the State's Attorneys in counties other than Cook County and to pay for expenses incurred by the Attorney General when the Attorney General is ordered by the presiding judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County to prosecute or supervise the prosecution of Cook County cases and for expenses incurred by the Attorney General in representing the State in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases. The Public Defender and State's Attorney in Cook County, the State Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, and the Attorney General may each request supplemental appropriations from the Trust Fund during the fiscal year.

(e) Moneys in the Trust Fund shall be expended only as follows:

(1) To pay the State Treasurer's costs to administer the Trust Fund. The amount for this purpose may not exceed 5% in any one fiscal year of the amount otherwise appropriated from the Trust Fund in the same fiscal year.

(2) To pay the capital litigation expenses of trial defense and post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases including, but not limited to, DNA testing, including DNA testing under Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, analysis, and expert testimony, investigatory and other assistance, expert, forensic, and other witnesses, and mitigation specialists, and grants and aid provided to public defenders, appellate defenders, and any attorney approved by or contracted with the State Appellate Defender representing petitioners in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases or assistance to attorneys who have been appointed by the court to represent defendants who are charged with capital crimes. Reasonable and necessary capital litigation expenses include travel and per diem (lodging, meals, and incidental expenses).

(3) To pay the compensation of trial attorneys, other than public defenders or appellate defenders, who have been appointed by the court to represent defendants who are charged with capital crimes or attorneys approved by or contracted with the State Appellate Defender to represent petitioners in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases.

(4) To provide State's Attorneys with funding for capital litigation expenses and for expenses of representing the State in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases including, but not limited to, investigatory and other assistance and expert, forensic, and other witnesses necessary to prosecute capital cases. State's Attorneys in any county other than Cook County seeking funding for capital litigation expenses and for expenses of representing the State in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases including, but not limited to, investigatory and other assistance and expert, forensic, or other witnesses under this Section may request that the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor or the Attorney General, as the case may be, certify the expenses as reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund, on a form created by the State Treasurer. Upon certification of the expenses and delivery of the certification to the State Treasurer, the Treasurer shall pay the expenses directly from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund if there are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to pay the expenses.

(5) To provide financial support through the Attorney General under the Attorney General Act for the several county State's Attorneys outside of Cook County, but shall not be used to increase personnel for the Attorney General's Office, except when the Attorney General is ordered by the presiding judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County to prosecute or supervise the prosecution of Cook County cases.

(6) To provide financial support through the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor under the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Act for the several county State's Attorneys outside of Cook County, but shall not be used to increase personnel for the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor.

(7) To provide financial support to the State Appellate Defender under the State Appellate Defender Act. Moneys expended from the Trust Fund shall be in addition to county funding for Public Defenders and State's Attorneys, and shall not be used to supplant or reduce ordinary and customary county funding.

(f) Moneys in the Trust Fund shall be appropriated to the State Appellate Defender, the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, the Attorney General, and the State Treasurer. The State Appellate Defender shall receive an appropriation from the Trust Fund to enable it to provide assistance to appointed defense counsel and attorneys approved by or contracted with the State Appellate Defender to represent petitioners in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases throughout the State and to Public Defenders in counties other than Cook. The State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor and the Attorney General shall receive appropriations from the Trust Fund to enable them to provide assistance to State's Attorneys in counties other than Cook County and when the Attorney General is ordered by the presiding judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County to prosecute or supervise the prosecution of Cook County cases. Moneys shall be appropriated to the State Treasurer to enable the Treasurer: (i) to make grants to Cook County; (ii) to pay the expenses of Public Defenders, the State Appellate Defender, the Attorney General, the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, and State's Attorneys in counties other than Cook County; (iii) to pay the expenses and compensation of appointed defense counsel and attorneys approved by or contracted with the State Appellate Defender to represent petitioners in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases in counties other than Cook County; and (iv) to pay the costs of administering the Trust Fund. All expenditures and grants made from the Trust Fund shall be subject to audit by the Auditor General.

(g) For Cook County, grants from the Trust Fund shall be made and administered as follows:

(1) For each State fiscal year, the State's Attorney and Public Defender must each make a separate application to the State Treasurer for capital litigation grants.

(2) The State Treasurer shall establish rules and procedures for grant applications. The rules shall require the Cook County Treasurer as the grant recipient to report on a periodic basis to the State Treasurer how much of the grant has been expended, how much of the grant is remaining, and the purposes for which the grant has been used. The rules may also require the Cook County Treasurer to certify on a periodic basis that expenditures of the funds have been made for expenses that are reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund.

(3) The State Treasurer shall make the grants to the Cook County Treasurer as soon as possible after the beginning of the State fiscal year.

(4) The State's Attorney or Public Defender may apply for supplemental grants during the fiscal year.

(5) Grant moneys shall be paid to the Cook County Treasurer in block grants and held in separate accounts for the State's Attorney, the Public Defender, and court appointed defense counsel other than the Cook County Public Defender, respectively, for the designated fiscal year, and are not subject to county appropriation.

(6) Expenditure of grant moneys under this subsection (g) is subject to audit by the Auditor General.

(7) The Cook County Treasurer shall immediately make payment from the appropriate separate account in the county treasury for capital litigation expenses to the State's Attorney, Public Defender, or court appointed defense counsel other than the Public Defender, as the case may be, upon order of the State's Attorney, Public Defender or the court, respectively.

(h) If a defendant in a capital case in Cook County is represented by court appointed counsel other than the Cook County Public Defender, the appointed counsel shall petition the court for an order directing the Cook County Treasurer to pay the court appointed counsel's reasonable and necessary compensation and capital litigation expenses from grant moneys provided from the Trust Fund. The petitions shall be supported by itemized bills showing the date, the amount of time spent, the work done and the total being charged for each entry. The court shall not authorize payment of bills that are not properly itemized. The petitions shall be filed under seal and considered ex parte but with a court reporter present for all ex parte conferences. The petitions shall be reviewed by both the trial judge and the presiding judge of the circuit court or the presiding judge's designee. The petitions and orders shall be kept under seal and shall be exempt from Freedom of Information requests until the conclusion of the trial and appeal of the case, even if the prosecution chooses not to pursue the death penalty prior to trial or sentencing. Orders denying petitions for compensation or expenses are final. Counsel may not petition for expenses that may have been provided or compensated by the State Appellate Defender under item (c)(5.1) of Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act.

(i) In counties other than Cook County, and when the Attorney General is ordered by the presiding judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County to prosecute or supervise the prosecution of Cook County cases, and excluding capital litigation expenses or services that may have been provided by the State Appellate Defender under item (c)(5.1) of Section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act:

(1) Upon certification by the circuit court, on a form created by the State Treasurer, that all or a portion of the expenses are reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund and the court's delivery of the certification to the Treasurer, the Treasurer shall pay the certified expenses of Public Defenders and the State Appellate Defender from the money appropriated to the Treasurer for capital litigation expenses of Public Defenders and post-conviction proceeding expenses in capital cases of the State Appellate Defender and expenses in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases in any county other than Cook County, if there are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to pay the expenses.

(2) If a defendant in a capital case is represented by court appointed counsel other than the Public Defender, the appointed counsel shall petition the court to certify compensation and capital litigation expenses including, but not limited to, investigatory and other assistance, expert, forensic, and other witnesses, and mitigation specialists as reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund. If a petitioner in a capital case who has filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or a petition under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases is represented by an attorney approved by or contracted with the State Appellate Defender other than the State Appellate Defender, that attorney shall petition the court to certify compensation and litigation expenses of post-conviction proceedings under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases. Upon certification on a form created by the State Treasurer of all or a portion of the compensation and expenses certified as reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for payment from the Trust Fund and the court's delivery of the certification to the Treasurer, the State Treasurer shall pay the certified compensation and expenses from the money appropriated to the Treasurer for that purpose, if there are sufficient moneys in the Trust Fund to make those payments.

(3) A petition for capital litigation expenses or post-conviction proceeding expenses or expenses incurred in filing a petition under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases under this subsection shall be considered under seal and reviewed ex parte with a court reporter present. Orders denying petitions for compensation or expenses are final.

(j) If the Trust Fund is discontinued or dissolved by an Act of the General Assembly or by operation of law, any balance remaining in the Trust Fund shall be returned to the General Revenue Fund after deduction of administrative costs, any other provision of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding.

Section 95. The Freedom of Information Act is amended by changing Section 7.5 as follows:

(5 ILCS 140/7.5)

Sec. 7.5. Statutory exemptions. To the extent provided for by the statutes referenced below, the following shall be exempt from inspection and copying:

(a) All information determined to be confidential under Section 4002 of the Technology Advancement and Development Act.

(b) Library circulation and order records identifying library users with specific materials under the Library Records Confidentiality Act.

(c) Applications, related documents, and medical records received by the Experimental Organ Transplantation Procedures Board and any and all documents or other records prepared by the Experimental Organ Transplantation Procedures Board or its staff relating to applications it has received.

(d) Information and records held by the Department of Public Health and its authorized representatives relating to known or suspected cases of sexually transmitted infection or any information the disclosure of which is restricted under the Illinois Sexually Transmitted Infection Control Act.

(e) Information the disclosure of which is exempted under Section 30 of the Radon Industry Licensing Act.

(f) Firm performance evaluations under Section 55 of the Architectural, Engineering, and Land Surveying Qualifications Based Selection Act.

(g) Information the disclosure of which is restricted and exempted under Section 50 of the Illinois Prepaid Tuition Act.

(h) Information the disclosure of which is exempted under the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, and records of any lawfully created State or local inspector general's office that would be exempt if created or obtained by an Executive Inspector General's office under that Act.

(i) Information contained in a local emergency energy plan submitted to a municipality in accordance with a local emergency energy plan ordinance that is adopted under Section 11-21.5-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code.

(j) Information and data concerning the distribution of surcharge moneys collected and remitted by carriers under the Emergency Telephone System Act.

(k) Law enforcement officer identification information or driver identification information compiled by a law enforcement agency or the Department of Transportation under Section 11-212 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(l) Records and information provided to a residential health care facility resident sexual assault and death review team or the Executive Council under the Abuse Prevention Review Team Act.

(m) Information provided to the predatory lending database created pursuant to Article 3 of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act, except to the extent authorized under that Article.

(n) Defense budgets and petitions for certification of compensation and expenses for court appointed trial counsel as provided under Sections 10 and 15 of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act of 2025 (repealed). This subsection (n) shall apply until the conclusion of the trial of the case, even if the prosecution chooses not to pursue the death penalty prior to trial or sentencing.

(o) Information that is prohibited from being disclosed under Section 4 of the Illinois Health and Hazardous Substances Registry Act.

(p) Security portions of system safety program plans, investigation reports, surveys, schedules, lists, data, or information compiled, collected, or prepared by or for the Department of Transportation under Sections 2705-300 and 2705-616 of the Department of Transportation Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois, the Regional Transportation Authority under Section 2.11 of the Regional Transportation Authority Act, or the St. Clair County Transit District under the Bi-State Transit Safety Act (repealed).

(q) Information prohibited from being disclosed by the Personnel Record Review Act.

(r) Information prohibited from being disclosed by the Illinois School Student Records Act.

(s) Information the disclosure of which is restricted under Section 5-108 of the Public Utilities Act.

(t) (Blank).

(u) Records and information provided to an independent team of experts under the Developmental Disability and Mental Health Safety Act (also known as Brian's Law).

(v) Names and information of people who have applied for or received Firearm Owner's Identification Cards under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act or applied for or received a concealed carry license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, unless otherwise authorized by the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; and databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, records of the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, and law enforcement agency objections under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.

(v-5) Records of the Firearm Owner's Identification Card Review Board that are exempted from disclosure under Section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.

(w) Personally identifiable information which is exempted from disclosure under subsection (g) of Section 19.1 of the Toll Highway Act.

(x) Information which is exempted from disclosure under Section 5-1014.3 of the Counties Code or Section 8-11-21 of the Illinois Municipal Code.

(y) Confidential information under the Adult Protective Services Act and its predecessor enabling statute, the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act, including information about the identity and administrative finding against any caregiver of a verified and substantiated decision of abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of an eligible adult maintained in the Registry established under Section 7.5 of the Adult Protective Services Act.

(z) Records and information provided to a fatality review team or the Illinois Fatality Review Team Advisory Council under Section 15 of the Adult Protective Services Act.

(aa) Information which is exempted from disclosure under Section 2.37 of the Wildlife Code.

(bb) Information which is or was prohibited from disclosure by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.

(cc) Recordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.

(dd) Information that is prohibited from being disclosed under Section 45 of the Condominium and Common Interest Community Ombudsperson Act.

(ee) Information that is exempted from disclosure under Section 30.1 of the Pharmacy Practice Act.

(ff) Information that is exempted from disclosure under the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.

(gg) Information that is prohibited from being disclosed under Section 7-603.5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(hh) Records that are exempt from disclosure under Section 1A-16.7 of the Election Code.

(ii) Information which is exempted from disclosure under Section 2505-800 of the Department of Revenue Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois.

(jj) Information and reports that are required to be submitted to the Department of Labor by registering day and temporary labor service agencies but are exempt from disclosure under subsection (a-1) of Section 45 of the Day and Temporary Labor Services Act.

(kk) Information prohibited from disclosure under the Seizure and Forfeiture Reporting Act.

(ll) Information the disclosure of which is restricted and exempted under Section 5-30.8 of the Illinois Public Aid Code.

(mm) Records that are exempt from disclosure under Section 4.2 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

(nn) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 70 of the Higher Education Student Assistance Act.

(oo) Communications, notes, records, and reports arising out of a peer support counseling session prohibited from disclosure under the First Responders Suicide Prevention Act.

(pp) Names and all identifying information relating to an employee of an emergency services provider or law enforcement agency under the First Responders Suicide Prevention Act.

(qq) Information and records held by the Department of Public Health and its authorized representatives collected under the Reproductive Health Act.

(rr) Information that is exempt from disclosure under the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act.

(ss) Data reported by an employer to the Department of Human Rights pursuant to Section 2-108 of the Illinois Human Rights Act.

(tt) Recordings made under the Children's Advocacy Center Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.

(uu) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 50 of the Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act.

(vv) Information that is exempt from disclosure under subsections (f) and (j) of Section 5-36 of the Illinois Public Aid Code.

(ww) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 16.8 of the State Treasurer Act.

(xx) Information that is exempt from disclosure or information that shall not be made public under the Illinois Insurance Code.

(yy) Information prohibited from being disclosed under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act.

(zz) Information prohibited from being disclosed under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.

(aaa) Information prohibited from being disclosed under Section 1-167 of the Illinois Pension Code.

(bbb) Information that is prohibited from disclosure by the Illinois Police Training Act and the Illinois State Police Act.

(ccc) Records exempt from disclosure under Section 2605-304 of the Illinois State Police Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois.

(ddd) Information prohibited from being disclosed under Section 35 of the Address Confidentiality for Victims of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Human Trafficking, or Stalking Act.

(eee) Information prohibited from being disclosed under subsection (b) of Section 75 of the Domestic Violence Fatality Review Act.

(fff) Images from cameras under the Expressway Camera Act. This subsection (fff) is inoperative on and after July 1, 2025.

(ggg) Information prohibited from disclosure under paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of Section 14 of the Nurse Agency Licensing Act.

(hhh) Information submitted to the Illinois State Police in an affidavit or application for an assault weapon endorsement, assault weapon attachment endorsement, .50 caliber rifle endorsement, or .50 caliber cartridge endorsement under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.

(iii) Data exempt from disclosure under Section 50 of the School Safety Drill Act.

(jjj) Information exempt from disclosure under Section 30 of the Insurance Data Security Law.

(kkk) Confidential business information prohibited from disclosure under Section 45 of the Paint Stewardship Act.

(lll) Data exempt from disclosure under Section 2-3.196 of the School Code.

(mmm) Information prohibited from being disclosed under subsection (e) of Section 1-129 of the Illinois Power Agency Act.

(nnn) Materials received by the Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity that are confidential under the Music and Musicians Tax Credit and Jobs Act.

(ooo) (nnn) Data or information provided pursuant to Section 20 of the Statewide Recycling Needs and Assessment Act.

(ppp) (nnn) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 28-11 of the Lawful Health Care Activity Act.

(qqq) (nnn) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 7-101 of the Illinois Human Rights Act.

(rrr) (mmm) Information prohibited from being disclosed under Section 4-2 of the Uniform Money Transmission Modernization Act.

(sss) (nnn) Information exempt from disclosure under Section 40 of the Student-Athlete Endorsement Rights Act.

(Source: P.A. 102-36, eff. 6-25-21; 102-237, eff. 1-1-22; 102-292, eff. 1-1-22; 102-520, eff. 8-20-21; 102-559, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 102-946, eff. 7-1-22; 102-1042, eff. 6-3-22; 102-1116, eff. 1-10-23; 103-8, eff. 6-7-23; 103-34, eff. 6-9-23; 103-142, eff. 1-1-24; 103-372, eff. 1-1-24; 103-472, eff. 8-1-24; 103-508, eff. 8-4-23; 103-580, eff. 12-8-23; 103-592, eff. 6-7-24; 103-605, eff. 7-1-24; 103-636, eff. 7-1-24; 103-724, eff. 1-1-25; 103-786, eff. 8-7-24; 103-859, eff. 8-9-24; 103-991, eff. 8-9-24; 103-1049, eff. 8-9-24; revised 11-26-24.)

Section 100. The State Finance Act is amended by adding Section 5.1030 as follows:

(30 ILCS 105/5.1030 new)

Sec. 5.1030. The Capital Litigation Trust Fund.

Section 105. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is amended by changing Sections 113-3 and 119-1 as follows:

(725 ILCS 5/113-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 113-3)

Sec. 113-3. (a) Every person charged with an offense shall be allowed counsel before pleading to the charge. If the defendant desires counsel and has been unable to obtain same before arraignment the court shall recess court or continue the cause for a reasonable time to permit defendant to obtain counsel and consult with him before pleading to the charge. If the accused is a dissolved corporation, and is not represented by counsel, the court may, in the interest of justice, appoint as counsel a licensed attorney of this State.

(b) In all cases, except where the penalty is a fine only, if the court determines that the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the Public Defender shall be appointed as counsel. If there is no Public Defender in the county or if the defendant requests counsel other than the Public Defender and the court finds that the rights of the defendant will be prejudiced by the appointment of the Public Defender, the court shall appoint as counsel a licensed attorney at law of this State, except that in a county having a population of 2,000,000 or more the Public Defender shall be appointed as counsel in all misdemeanor cases where the defendant is indigent and desires counsel unless the case involves multiple defendants, in which case the court may appoint counsel other than the Public Defender for the additional defendants. The court shall require an affidavit signed by any defendant who requests court-appointed counsel. Such affidavit shall be in the form established by the Supreme Court containing sufficient information to ascertain the assets and liabilities of that defendant. The Court may direct the Clerk of the Circuit Court to assist the defendant in the completion of the affidavit. Any person who knowingly files such affidavit containing false information concerning his assets and liabilities shall be liable to the county where the case, in which such false affidavit is filed, is pending for the reasonable value of the services rendered by the public defender or other court-appointed counsel in the case to the extent that such services were unjustly or falsely procured.

(c) Upon the filing with the court of a verified statement of services rendered the court shall order the county treasurer of the county of trial to pay counsel other than the Public Defender a reasonable fee. The court shall consider all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to the time spent while court is in session, other time spent in representing the defendant, and expenses reasonably incurred by counsel. In counties with a population greater than 2,000,000, the court shall order the county treasurer of the county of trial to pay counsel other than the Public Defender a reasonable fee stated in the order and based upon a rate of compensation of not more than $40 for each hour spent while court is in session and not more than $30 for each hour otherwise spent representing a defendant, and such compensation shall not exceed $150 for each defendant represented in misdemeanor cases and $1250 in felony cases, in addition to expenses reasonably incurred as hereinafter in this Section provided, except that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the limits herein stated may be made if the trial court certifies that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation. A trial court may entertain the filing of this verified statement before the termination of the cause, and may order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.

(d) In capital cases, in addition to counsel, if the court determines that the defendant is indigent the court may, upon the filing with the court of a verified statement of services rendered, order the county Treasurer of the county of trial to pay necessary expert witnesses for defendant reasonable compensation stated in the order not to exceed $250 for each defendant.

(e) If the court in any county having a population greater than 2,000,000 determines that the defendant is indigent the court may, upon the filing with the court of a verified statement of such expenses, order the county treasurer of the county of trial, in such counties having a population greater than 2,000,000 to pay the general expenses of the trial incurred by the defendant not to exceed $50 for each defendant.

(f) The provisions of this Section relating to appointment of counsel, compensation of counsel, and payment of expenses in capital cases apply except when the compensation and expenses are being provided under the Capital Crimes Litigation Act of 2025.

(Source: P.A. 91-589, eff. 1-1-00.)

(725 ILCS 5/119-1)

Sec. 119-1. Death penalty restored abolished.

(a) (Blank). Beginning on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and a sentence to death may not be imposed.

(b) All unobligated and unexpended moneys remaining in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly shall be transferred into the Death Penalty Abolition Fund on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 104th General Assembly shall be transferred into the Capital Litigation Trust Fund , a special fund in the State treasury, to be expended by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, for services for families of victims of homicide or murder and for training of law enforcement personnel.

(Source: P.A. 96-1543, eff. 7-1-11.)

Section 110. The State Appellate Defender Act is amended by changing Section 10 as follows:

(725 ILCS 105/10) (from Ch. 38, par. 208-10)

Sec. 10. Powers and duties of State Appellate Defender.

(a) The State Appellate Defender shall represent indigent persons on appeal in criminal and delinquent minor proceedings, when appointed to do so by a court under a Supreme Court Rule or law of this State.

(b) The State Appellate Defender shall submit a budget for the approval of the State Appellate Defender Commission.

(c) The State Appellate Defender may:

(1) maintain a panel of private attorneys available to serve as counsel on a case basis;

(2) establish programs, alone or in conjunction with law schools, for the purpose of utilizing volunteer law students as legal assistants;

(3) cooperate and consult with state agencies, professional associations, and other groups concerning the causes of criminal conduct, the rehabilitation and correction of persons charged with and convicted of crime, the administration of criminal justice, and, in counties of less than 1,000,000 population, study, design, develop and implement model systems for the delivery of trial level defender services, and make an annual report to the General Assembly;

(4) hire investigators to provide investigative services to appointed counsel and county public defenders;

(5) (blank);

(5.1) in cases in which a death sentence is an authorized disposition, provide trial counsel with legal assistance and the assistance of expert witnesses, investigators, and mitigation specialists from funds appropriated to the State Appellate Defender specifically for that purpose by the General Assembly. The Office of State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to serve as trial counsel in capital cases;

(5.5) provide training to county public defenders;

(5.7) provide county public defenders with the assistance of expert witnesses and investigators from funds appropriated to the State Appellate Defender specifically for that purpose by the General Assembly. The Office of the State Appellate Defender shall not be appointed to act as trial counsel;

(6) develop a Juvenile Defender Resource Center to: (i) study, design, develop, and implement model systems for the delivery of trial level defender services for juveniles in the justice system; (ii) in cases in which a sentence of incarceration or an adult sentence, or both, is an authorized disposition, provide trial counsel with legal advice and the assistance of expert witnesses and investigators from funds appropriated to the Office of the State Appellate Defender by the General Assembly specifically for that purpose; (iii) develop and provide training to public defenders on juvenile justice issues, utilizing resources including the State and local bar associations, the Illinois Public Defender Association, law schools, the Midwest Juvenile Defender Center, and pro bono efforts by law firms; and (iv) make an annual report to the General Assembly.

Investigators employed by the Capital Trial Assistance Unit and Capital Post Conviction Unit of the State Appellate Defender shall be authorized to inquire through the Illinois State Police or local law enforcement with the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) under Section 2605-375 of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois to ascertain whether their potential witnesses have a criminal background, including, but not limited to: (i) warrants; (ii) arrests; (iii) convictions; and (iv) officer safety information. This authorization applies only to information held on the State level and shall be used only to protect the personal safety of the investigators. Any information that is obtained through this inquiry may not be disclosed by the investigators.

(c-5) For each State fiscal year, the State Appellate Defender shall request a direct appropriation from the Capital Litigation Trust Fund for expenses incurred by the State Appellate Defender in providing assistance to trial attorneys under paragraph (5.1) of subsection (c) of this Section and for expenses incurred by the State Appellate Defender in representing petitioners in capital cases in post-conviction proceedings under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and in relation to petitions filed under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to capital cases and for the representation of those petitioners by attorneys approved by or contracted with the State Appellate Defender and an appropriation to the State Treasurer for payments from the Trust Fund for the defense of cases in counties other than Cook County. The State Appellate Defender may appear before the General Assembly at other times during the State's fiscal year to request supplemental appropriations from the Trust Fund to the State Treasurer.

(d) (Blank).

(e) The requirement for reporting to the General Assembly shall be satisfied by filing copies of the report as required by Section 3.1 of the General Assembly Organization Act and filing such additional copies with the State Government Report Distribution Center for the General Assembly as is required under paragraph (t) of Section 7 of the State Library Act.

(Source: P.A. 99-78, eff. 7-20-15; 100-1148, eff. 12-10-18.)

Section 115. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended by changing Section 5-8-1 as follows:

(730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1)

Sec. 5-8-1. Natural life imprisonment; enhancements for use of a firearm; mandatory supervised release terms.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense or in Article 4.5 of Chapter V, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, subject to Section 5-4.5-115 of this Code, according to the following limitations:

(1) for first degree murder,

(a) (blank),

(a-1) if the defendant had at the time of the commission of the offense attained 18 years of age or more, the court may sentence the defendant to death under the procedures described in subsections (a-2) through (a-11) if:

(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer, employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections or any similar local correctional agency, or fireman killed in the course of performing his or her official duties, to prevent the performance of his or her official duties, or in retaliation for performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was so employed;

(2) the defendant has been convicted of murdering 2 or more individuals under subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; or

(3) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty;

(4) the murder was committed by the defendant upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes;

(5) the murder was committed by the defendant in connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of the Criminal Code of 2012; or

(6) the murdered individual was a member of a congregation engaged in prayer or other religious activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship.

(a-2) The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider, any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include, but need not be limited to, those factors set forth in subsections (b) and (b-5). Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:

(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;

(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;

(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;

(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;

(5) the defendant was not personally present during commission of the act or acts causing death;

(6) the defendant's background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse;

(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity. Provided, however, that an action that does not otherwise mitigate first degree murder cannot qualify as a mitigating factor for first degree murder because of the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the victim's sexual orientation as defined in Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human Rights Act.

(a-3) If requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsections (b) and (b-5) and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in this subsection (a-2). The proceeding shall be conducted:

(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or

(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the proceeding if:

(A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; or

(B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury; or

(C) the court for good cause shown discharges the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or

(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a jury for the separate proceeding.

(a-4) During the proceeding any information relevant to any of the factors set forth in subsections (b) and (b-5) may be presented by either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (a-2) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.

(a-5) The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the factors set forth in subsections (b) and (b-5) is on the State and shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.

(a-6) If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none of the factors set forth in subsections (b) and (b-5) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more of the factors set forth in subsections (b) and (b-5) exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not concur with the jury determination that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the court to non-concur with the sentence. This document and any attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review. The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing determination. If after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(a-7) In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds that none of the factors found in subsections (b) and (b-5) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set forth in subsections (b) and (b-5) exists, the court shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (a-2). If the court determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court finds that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(a-8) In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If the court decertifies the case as a capital case under either of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the decertification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing.

(a-9) The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.

(a-10) If the death penalty in this amendatory Act of the 104th General Assembly is held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V. If any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V.

(a-11) The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not have the force of law and are only advisory in nature, or

(b) if a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in subparagraph (b-5) are present, the court may sentence the defendant, subject to Section 5-4.5-105, to a term of natural life imprisonment, or

(b-5) a A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder for which the death penalty has not been imposed by the court may be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment if:

(1) the murdered individual was an inmate at an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof;

(2) the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus, or other public conveyance;

(3) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement, or understanding by which he or she was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value;

(4) the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if:

(A) the murdered individual:

(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or

(ii) received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and (B) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this clause (4), the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and

(B) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this clause (4), the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and

(C) the other felony was an inherently violent crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this clause (C), "inherently violent crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion;

(5) the defendant committed the murder with intent to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this clause (5), "participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors;

(6) the defendant, while committing an offense punishable under Section 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407, or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual;

(7) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual;

(8) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme, or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom;

(9) the defendant was a principal administrator, organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person;

(10) the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this clause (10), torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering, or agony of the victim;

(11) the murder was committed as a result of the intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle;

(12) the murdered individual was a person with a disability and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a person with a disability. For purposes of this clause (12), "person with a disability" means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care;

(13) the murdered individual was subject to an order of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986;

(14) the murdered individual was known by the defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes;

(15) the murder was committed by the defendant in connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code;

(16) the murdered individual was a member of a congregation engaged in prayer or other religious activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship; or

(17)(i) the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse;

(ii) the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse; and

(iii) the murdered individual was killed in the course of acting in his or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse, or to prevent him or her from acting in that capacity, or in retaliation for his or her acting in that capacity.

(c) if the court does not impose the death penalty, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 18, and:

(i) has previously been convicted of first degree murder under any state or federal law, or

(ii) is found guilty of murdering more than one victim, or

(iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker when the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the peace officer or fireman from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker from performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer, fireman, or emergency management worker, or

(iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, when the employee was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or to prevent the employee from performing his official duties, or in retaliation for the employee performing his official duties, or

(v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid person while employed by a municipality or other governmental unit when the person was killed in the course of performing official duties or to prevent the person from performing official duties or in retaliation for performing official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistant or first aid personnel, or

(vi) (blank), or

(vii) is found guilty of first degree murder and the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer. For the purpose of this Section, "community policing volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

For purposes of clause (v), "emergency medical technician - ambulance", "emergency medical technician - intermediate", and "emergency medical technician - paramedic", have the meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.

(d)(i) if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(ii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(iii) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.

(2) (blank);

(2.5) for a person who has attained the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense and who is convicted under the circumstances described in subdivision (b)(1)(B) of Section 11-1.20 or paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section 12-13, subdivision (d)(2) of Section 11-1.30 or paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Section 12-14, subdivision (b)(1.2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1, subdivision (b)(2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the sentence shall be a term of natural life imprisonment.

(b) (Blank).

(c) (Blank).

(d) Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8, the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be written as part of the sentencing order and shall be as follows:

(1) for first degree murder or for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or before December 12, 2005, 3 years;

(1.5) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this subsection (d), for a Class X felony except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, and except for the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child with sentencing under subsection (d) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, 18 months;

(2) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this subsection (d), for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony except for the offense of criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offenses of manufacture and dissemination of child pornography under clauses (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, and except for the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, 12 months;

(3) except as provided in paragraph (4), (6), or (7) of this subsection (d), for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4 felony, 6 months; no later than 45 days after the onset of the term of mandatory supervised release, the Prisoner Review Board shall conduct a discretionary discharge review pursuant to the provisions of Section 3-3-8, which shall include the results of a standardized risk and needs assessment tool administered by the Department of Corrections; the changes to this paragraph (3) made by Public Act 102-1104 this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly apply to all individuals released on mandatory supervised release on or after December 6, 2022 (the effective date of Public Act 102-1104) this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, including those individuals whose sentences were imposed prior to December 6, 2022 (the effective date of Public Act 102-1104) this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly;

(4) for defendants who commit the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715), or who commit the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, manufacture of child pornography, or dissemination of child pornography after January 1, 2009, or who commit the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child under paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or who commit the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child with sentencing under subsection (d) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant;

(5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an electronic monitoring or home detention program under Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code;

(6) for a felony domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, and a felony violation of an order of protection, 4 years;

(7) for any felony described in paragraph (a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(vi), (a)(2.1), (a)(2.3), (a)(2.4), (a)(2.5), or (a)(2.6) of Article 5, Section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections requiring an inmate to serve a minimum of 85% of their court-imposed sentence, except for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offense of aggravated child pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, and except for the offense of obscene depiction of a purported child with sentencing under subsection (d) of Section 11-20.4 of the Criminal Code of 2012, and except as provided in paragraph (4) or paragraph (6) of this subsection (d), the term of mandatory supervised release shall be as follows:

(A) Class X felony, 3 years;

(B) Class 1 or Class 2 felonies, 2 years;

(C) Class 3 or Class 4 felonies, 1 year.

(e) (Blank).

(f) (Blank).

(g) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act and of Public Act 101-652: (i) the provisions of paragraph (3) of subsection (d) are effective on July 1, 2022 and shall apply to all individuals convicted on or after the effective date of paragraph (3) of subsection (d); and (ii) the provisions of paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of subsection (d) are effective on July 1, 2021 and shall apply to all individuals convicted on or after the effective date of paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of subsection (d).

(Source: P.A. 102-28, eff. 6-25-21; 102-687, eff. 12-17-21; 102-694, eff. 1-7-22; 102-1104, eff. 12-6-22; 103-51, eff. 1-1-24; 103-825, eff. 1-1-25; revised 10-24-24.)

Section 999. Effective date. This Act takes effect January 1, 2026.